The Untold Story of Al Qaeda\u27s Administrative Law Dilemmas by Cuéllar, Mariano-Florentino




The Untold Story of Al Qaeda's Administrative Law
Dilemmas
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cuéllar, Mariano-Florentino, "The Untold Story of Al Qaeda's Administrative Law Dilemmas" (2007). Minnesota Law Review. 642.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/642




The Untold Story of al Qaeda’s 
Administrative Law Dilemmas 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar† 
Introduction ........................................................................... 1304 
I.  Peering Inside a Terrorist Network ............................ 1315 
A. Context and Methods ............................................ 1317 
B. Themes Evident in Jihadi Strategic Studies ....... 1321 
1. Western Resolve and Imperial Overstretch ... 1321 
2. Protecting Organizational Survival ................ 1324 
3. Crafting a Long-Term Plan to Achieve  
(Surprisingly Conventional) Strategic Goals ... 1327 
4. Subtle Parallels Between Terrorist Networks 
and State Bureaucracies ................................. 1330 
II.  Learning from al Qaeda’s Administrative Law  
Dilemmas ..................................................................... 1337 
A. Agency Problems and Information Gaps ............. 1338 
B. Centrality of Public Approval and Disapproval .. 1344 
C. Al Qaeda’s Drive to Solve Its Administrative 
Law Dilemmas ...................................................... 1350 
III.  Strategic Conflict as a Duel Among Competing  
Systems to Manage Administrative Problems ........... 1354 
Conclusion .............................................................................. 1366 
 
In the months and years following September 11, senior al 
Qaeda strategists and sympathizers disseminated a series of 
manuscripts revealing the terrorist network’s aims and its in-
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ternal management dilemmas. This Article elucidates how we 
can better evaluate changes in our counter-terrorism laws and 
policies—from warrantless NSA surveillance to massive mili-
tary operations abroad—by scrutinizing the goals and internal 
organizational problems of our adversaries. Conventional wis-
dom paints terrorist networks such as al Qaeda and state bu-
reaucracies in advanced industrialized countries as starkly dif-
ferent. Al Qaeda and its allies are assumed to pose particularly 
severe dangers because they are flexible, adaptable, decentral-
ized, and staffed by committed supporters with a common goal. 
By contrast, state bureaucracies in advanced industrialized na-
tions are often described as suffering from plodding, rule-bound 
decision-making structures that hobble their response to our 
nimble adversary. But a closer look at al Qaeda’s own strategic 
studies—read in light of social scientists’ emerging analyses of 
terrorist organizations—reveals a more complex picture. In it, 
the distinction between terrorist networks and bureaucratic 
agencies is less pronounced than commonly supposed. Both en-
tities face pervasive problems involving the harnessing of ex-
pertise, the resolution of conflict among politically important 
players, reconciliation of competing goals, restraints on over-
zealous action, building public legitimacy, and monitoring sub-
ordinate activity. By scrutinizing terrorist networks as collec-
tive entities with conflicting goals facing evasive administrative 
problems, we can better understand three things: (1) that, in 
fact, terrorist networks have repeatedly sought to develop ad-
ministrative procedures and law-like hierarchical arrange-
ments to manage their problems; (2) that the efficacy of 
counter-terrorism strategies depends crucially on the extent to 
which such strategies exacerbate (at a reasonable cost) these 
networks’ administrative problems; and (3) that legal arrange-
ments characteristic of U.S. public law—particularly those gov-
erning the administrative decisions of bureaucratic institu-
tions—are valuable in part because they assuage the very 
problems that our terrorist adversaries are so desperately try-
ing to solve. 
∗ ∗ ∗ 
“By the grace of God, the organized Islamic work is beginning to 
be managed on the highest administrative level . . . especially 
the jihadi organizations. However there still needs to be more 
mastery, general training, and advancement in order to encom-
pass the greatest amount of the sectors of the Islamic movement, 
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especially since we are approaching (by the permission of God) a 
stage in which our administrative needs will be expanded in 
what we have called the stage of the administration of savagery, 
where we will mix with hundreds of thousands of people and 
they will require the administration of regions from us as di-
minished governments. If we are not prepared to deal with that, 
we will face dangerous problems, to say nothing of the harm 
(that results from) random behavior or (from) a rigid manage-
ment organization which stops action by its inflexibility and 
prevents development and advancement.”1 
 
“Bureaucracies rationalize the problems and processes with 
which they work, allowing them to develop systems . . . . That 
system does not consist simply of rules and regulations. Rather, 
the rules are accompanied by standards, practices, guidelines, 
prototypes, models, and informal procedures, all shaped to some 
extent by a general goal . . . .”2 
     
Americans lived through such a raft of changes in the half-
decade after the September 11 attacks that evaluating those 
changes became a cottage industry in legal scholarship. Law-
makers entrusted the executive to manage sweeping new sur-
veillance and war-fighting powers.3 When the executive 
doubted whether Congress would convey even more powers for 
surveillance, it implemented some tactics without congressional 
authorization.4 The American military engaged in complex mis-
sions in Afghanistan and Iraq.5 It deposed brutal regimes, but 
 
 1. ABU BAKR NAJI, THE MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY 23 (William 
McCants trans., Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Mil. Acad., 2006) (discuss-
ing al Qaeda leadership). 
 2. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 61–62 (1993). 
 3. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001); Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolu-
tion of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002); Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272. 
 4. See infra Part III (discussing the administration’s policy of using the 
National Security Agency for warrantless surveillance precluded by the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101–
111, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.)). 
 5. See generally MARTIN EWANS, CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN: STUDIES IN 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 164–68 (2005) (discussing the U.S. invasion of Af-
ghanistan); DAVID L. PHILLIPS, LOSING IRAQ: INSIDE THE POSTWAR RECON-
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thousands of American soldiers—and many tens of thousands 
of foreign civilians—died in the process.6 U.S. intelligence or-
ganizations redoubled their efforts to track wire transfers and 
enemy operatives, and became embroiled in a now infamous 
tug-of-war with the White House about the justifications for 
war in Iraq.7 Some of the nation’s most distinguished diplomats 
staked their reputation on the strength of that intelligence.8 
U.S. personnel detained thousands,9 abusing and killing some 
of them in the course of interrogations,10 and rendering others 
to regimes with established track records of torture and human 
rights abuses.11 Courts began sorting through fundamental 
questions—raised perhaps once in a generation—about the 
scope of executive power,12 the role of international law in our 
legal system,13 and the constitutional guarantees afforded to 
detained individuals.14 Predictably, most of these developments 
inspired considerable public debate. 
But they were far from the only changes. A bit further from 
the limelight, criminal justice bureaucracies achieved long-
sought changes in criminal statutes and deployed their im-
 
STRUCTION FIASCO 7–11 (2005) (discussing U.S. difficulties associated with the 
invasion of and reconstruction of Iraq). 
 6. See, e.g., Erik Mink, Grasping for Answers as Iraq Unravels, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 24, 2006, at D11 (discussing estimates of civilian and 
military deaths and casualties). 
 7. See generally COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE 
U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 154–56 (2005) (criticizing the intelligence community’s 
assessment of Iraqi programs allegedly involving weapons of mass destruc-
tion). 
 8. See, e.g., THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVEN-
TURE IN IRAQ 90–94 (2006) (discussing the weaknesses in the case then-
Secretary of State Colin Powell presented to the United Nations regarding the 
administration’s case for attacking Iraq). 
 9. See generally Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 
2085, 2088–89 (2005) (indicating there were almost 700 detainees at 
Guantánamo and hundreds elsewhere). 
 10. See id. at 2092–93 (describing detainee abuse); Deaths of Detainees in 
the Custody of U.S. Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002 to 2005, http:// 
www.medscape.com/viewarticle/547787 (last visited Apr. 9, 2007) (accounting 
for detainee deaths while in custody and describing causes of death). 
 11. See David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A 
Human Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 129 (2006). 
 12. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773–74 (2006) (balancing 
executive and congressional power over the armed forces). 
 13. Id. at 2786. 
 14. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 524–25 (2004). 
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mense breadth against alleged supporters of terrorism15 and 
other targets.16 Executive branch officials prioritized secrecy in 
response to Freedom of Information Act requests,17 environ-
mental regulation,18 and immigration proceedings.19 Congress 
gave regulators complex new authority to control cross-border 
financial flows to disrupt money laundering and terrorist fi-
nancing.20 And working in tandem, legislators and the Presi-
dent undertook the most significant transformation of the fed-
eral bureaucracy in a half-century, forging a sprawling new 
Department of Homeland Security,21 a new intelligence over-
sight bureaucracy,22 and a new set of budget priorities reshap-
ing the allocation of federal resources.23 Together, these devel-
opments paint a startling picture, in which nearly a half-
century of legal changes has been crammed into sixty months. 
 
 15. See Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (containing 
numerous substantive criminal law provisions); Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage 
Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 
CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1329 (2004) (“Although trumpeted as anti-terrorism legisla-
tion, it vastly expands police powers in terrorism and non-terrorism cases 
alike. As some members of Congress have admitted, they voted for the legisla-
tion without having read it entirely.”). For the Department of Justice’s per-
spective on terrorism-related prosecutions and investigations associated with 
the new Patriot Act passed in the wake of the attacks, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, REPORT FROM THE FIELD: THE USA PATRIOT ACT AT WORK 2–5 (2004). 
 16. See Eric Lictblau, U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes from Drugs 
to Swindling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at 1. 
 17. See Keith Anderson, Note, Is There Still a “Sound Legal Basis?”: The 
Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605, 
1620–24 (2003). 
 18. See Rena Steinzor, Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors: The Home-
land Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
641, 660 (2003). 
 19. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 961 (2002); 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 369, 373 (2006). 
 20. See Patriot Act, tit. III (outlining regulatory provisions governing 
money laundering and terrorist financing). For a discussion of the significance 
of these changes, see Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Mismatch Between 
State Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 15, 37–39 (2004). 
 21. See Dara Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the 
Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 696–700 (2006). 
 22. For an insightful analysis of this development, see Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing 
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1673–75 (2006). 
 23. See id. at 1667.  
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My purpose here is not to dwell directly on these develop-
ments.24 Instead, this Article raises questions about how best to 
assess legal change by mining an underappreciated vein of 
knowledge about the organization of terrorist activity. In the 
process, the Article contributes to an applied scholarly litera-
ture on national security law in the administrative state, and to 
a more theoretical one concerned with the legal implications of 
social science research on complex organizations. 
The argument begins by engaging a familiar trope. Con-
ventional wisdom suggests that terrorist networks such as al 
Qaeda are quintessentially different from the complex national 
security and regulatory bureaucracies charged with countering 
the threat that terrorists pose.25 Discussions of the aforemen-
 
 24. Although it is tempting to do so, most of those developments have 
been the subject of substantial and often quite thoughtful commentary (includ-
ing in some well-reasoned pieces appearing in this Symposium). On the other 
hand, certain occurrences—particularly the significance of bureaucratic 
changes, budget reforms, and criminal justice policies—have plainly received 
less reflection than they merit. But see id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative 
Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2669 (2005); David Zaring & Elena 
Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming May 
2007) (manuscript at 11, on file with author). 
 25. See, e.g., Scott Canon, West Will Win War on Terror, Rumsfeld Assures 
University, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 10, 2006, at A15. 
[Rumsfeld, focusing on terrorism] described an effort that has battled 
against an elusive enemy and labored to overcome bureaucratic and 
political hurdles at home . . . . He said the military needs to transform 
to a more agile force capable of changing tactics to deal with terror-
ists . . . . “The enemy has a brain,” he said. “They do things, and they 
adjust.” 
Id. Similar views are voiced by policy analysts outside government, as evi-
denced by the following statement from a well-placed observer of national se-
curity at a leading Washington, D.C. think-tank: 
The threat we face from al Qaeda and other terrorist groups is one of 
agile, non-bureaucratic adversaries who have the great advantage of 
being on the offense—knowing where, when and how they will at-
tack. . . . [T]errorist groups have always been nimble opponents that 
were difficult to stop . . . . No security threat to the United States 
matches this one. To fight this nontraditional threat, we must think 
outside [the] box and try to be as nimble as the opponent (a difficult 
task). 
Protecting the Homeland: The President’s Proposal for Reorganizing Our 
Homeland Defense Infrastructure, Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terror-
ism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, available 
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print_testimony.cfm?id=294&wit_id=667 (2002) 
(statement of Ivan Eland, Director, Defense Policy Studies, Cato Institute). As 
will emerge, reality is far more complicated. Although terrorists are adaptable, 
they face considerable organizational problems in adapting. And while they 
have partially decentralized (and some strategists would prefer even greater 
decentralization), terrorist networks such as al Qaeda also find crucial bene-
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tioned changes are often clouded by seductive assumptions de-
rived from that conventional wisdom: that our terrorist adver-
saries can be understood as nimble, endlessly adaptable actors 
simultaneously able to capture the advantages of decentraliza-
tion while functioning as a unitary actor motivated by a single 
coherent goal.26 This Article shows this assumption to be pro-
foundly misleading. Terrorist organizations are complex enti-
ties. They are enveloped in a multitude of organizational prob-
lems that necessarily make principled discussions of legal 
responses to terrorism far more intricate than conventional 
wisdom might suggest. 
 
fits from hierarchy. See infra Part I.B.4. This has kept such organizations par-
tially hierarchical even in the midst of protracted crises. In addition, both be-
fore and during such crises, some theorists believe the most crucial character-
istics terrorist networks should develop are essentially those sometimes 
considered to be outdated in some superficial observations of national bu-
reaucracies, including law-like procedures, trained managers working as part 
of a hierarchy, and monitoring mechanisms to mitigate agency problems. See 
NAJI, supra note 1, at 23, 73–74; infra Part II.C. As used in this Article, the 
term “terrorist network” refers to organized nonstate entities whose leaders 
both desire and find it feasible to use a range of tactics including terrorist at-
tacks. 
 26. For a sampling of presidential statements treating the terrorist threat 
as one posed by a unitary actor with a single, coherent ideology, see The 
President’s News Conference, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1877, 1880 (Oct. 
25, 2006) (“Afghanistan was a front in this war against the terrorists. Iraq is 
now the central front in the war against the terrorists. This war is more than 
just finding people and bringing them to justice; this war is an ideological con-
flict between a radical ideology that can’t stand freedom, and moderate, rea-
sonable people that hope to live in a peaceful society.”). For an example of a 
scholarly paper modeling a terrorist organization as a unitary actor, see Paul 
R. Pillar, Counterterrorism after al Qaeda, 27 WASH. Q. 101, 102 (2004); 
Robert Powell, Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources 
(Aug. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.wcfia.harvard 
.edu/seminars/pegroup/Powelldefendaug05.pdf (providing an example of a schol-
arly paper modeling a terrorist group as a unitary actor). Pillar eloquently 
emphasizes the “threat of decentralization” trope: 
The small, secretive nature of terrorist plots and the indeterminate 
nature of the target—likely to become an even greater problem as the 
Islamic terrorist threat further decentralizes—have always made ter-
rorism a particularly difficult target subject. . . . The danger now lies 
in the fact that the looser the operational connections become and the 
less Islamist terrorism is instigated by a single figure, the harder it 
will be to uncover exploitable links and the more likely that the insti-
gators of future terrorist attacks will escape the notice of U.S. intelli-
gence. In a more decentralized network, these individuals will go un-
noticed not because data on analysts’ screens are misinterpreted but 
because they will never appear on those screens in the first place. 
Pillar, supra, at 102–04. 
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The alternative is not to forswear the instrumental analy-
sis of counter-terrorism tactics. Instead, the key to any reason-
able policy response lies in systematically examining the stra-
tegic dilemmas and organizational challenges confronting 
terrorist networks such as al Qaeda. Terrorists, like drug car-
tels and legislatures, are a “they,” not an “it,” best understood 
as organized entities facing some of the same institutional 
problems that conventional state bureaucracies face.27 Though 
animated by different strategic imperatives, leaders of terrorist 
networks and managers of public agencies shoulder common 
burdens. Their power depends on mitigating principal-agent 
problems.28 They must harness expert knowledge, and they 
yearn for a beguiling yet endlessly elusive synthesis of technoc-
racy and political vision.29 Their power depends in part on fos-
tering favorable public perceptions30 and adjudicating dis-
 
 27. See infra Parts I, II.A. Although the focus of this case study is primar-
ily on al Qaeda and its affiliates, other illicit nonstate actors (particularly 
those interested in using terrorist tactics) are likely to face substantially simi-
lar organizational problems. The analysis therefore holds broader implica-
tions. 
 28. For a discussion of principal-agent problems, see Mathew McCubbins 
& Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Ver-
sus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 171–73 (1984). For an insightful 
analysis of how principal-agent problems distort the operations of terrorist 
networks, see Jacob Shapiro, The Greedy Terrorist: A Rational-Choice Perspec-
tive on Terrorist Organizations’ Inefficiencies and Vulnerabilities, 4 STRATEGIC 
INSIGHTS 1, 2 (2005); infra notes 156–57 and accompanying text (providing 
examples of how al Qaeda strategists face principal-agent problems). 
 29. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 23 (“The mastery of the art of administra-
tion saves a lot of time and blesses the effort exerted (to acquire it), especially 
since we are in a race against time and we need to undertake any effort in 
such a way that we get the best results.”). For a similarly effusive exaltation of 
technocratic ideals in the context of the American administrative state, see 
BREYER, supra note 2, at 61–62. For critiques discussing the simultaneous al-
lure of technocracy along with the impossibility of using technocracy to resolve 
normative problems of administration, see generally Gerald E. Frug, The Ide-
ology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984) (discuss-
ing the tension between administrative models founded on expertise and sug-
gesting limits to agency actions); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (comparing ad-
ministrative discretion with judicial controls on discretion). 
 30. See PETER BERGEN, THE OSAMA BIN LADEN I KNOW 392 (2006). Refer-
ring to top al Qaeda strategist Ayman al Zawahiri, Bergen notes, “Zawahiri 
complained in his 2001 biography, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner, that 
the masses have not embraced al-Qaeda . . . . ‘The jihad movement must come 
closer to the masses. We must win the people’s confidence, respect, and affec-
tion.’” Id. For discussions of the value of favorable public perceptions to admin-
istrative bureaucracies in advanced industrialized countries, see Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 
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putes.31 In short, both terrorist networks and conventional pub-
lic agencies are burdened by some of the challenges routinely 
managed by U.S. administrative law. While scrutinizing the 
administrative problems of al Qaeda and analogous organiza-
tions is manifestly more challenging than merely restating 
common assumptions about nonstate actors,32 this scrutiny will 
reward scholars and policymakers with a host of valuable in-
sights crucial to any defensible evaluation of post-September 11 
legal changes. 
My argument focuses on three insights in particular. First, 
although circumstances have forced terrorist networks to adopt 
a measure of decentralization, those networks have often 
sought to build administrative procedures and law-like hierar-
chical arrangements to strike a balance between flexibility and 
control and to mitigate the recurring organizational problems 
associated with managing painfully scarce resources. Second, 
policymakers should evaluate counter-terrorism policies on the 
basis of whether they exacerbate terrorist networks’ ongoing 
organizational challenges—challenges such as fostering public 
approval and mitigating agency problems—at a reasonable 
cost. Third, administrative arrangements characteristic of how 
advanced industrialized democracies manage organizational 
problems are valuable in part because they tend to manage 
pervasive organizational problems more effectively than non-
state terrorist actors manage such problems. In contrast, a less 
organization-focused evaluation of terrorist networks is likely 
to emphasize simple but misleading assumptions over complex-
ity,33 shorter-term tactical gains over gradual strategic pro-
 
495–97 (2005); infra note 134.  
 31. See LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER 134 (2006) (discussing 
the problems faced by al Qaeda at its early stages of development as a result of 
internal squabbles). 
 32. Compare The President’s News Conference, supra note 26, at 1880 
(“[T]his war is an ideological conflict between a radical ideology that can’t 
stand freedom . . . .”), with Martha Crenshaw, The Causes of Terrorism, 13 
COMP. POL. 379, 385 (1981) (“As purposeful activity, terrorism is the result of 
an organization’s decision that it is a politically useful means to oppose a gov-
ernment. . . . Terrorism serves a variety of goals, both revolutionary and 
subrevolutionary. Terrorists may be revolutionaries[,] . . . minority separatists 
combating indigenous regimes[,] . . . reformists[,] . . . anarchists or millenari-
ans . . . or reactionaries acting to prevent change from the top.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democ-
ratic Failure, 92 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1099 (2006). Posner and Vermeule assume 
that terrorist threats are best modeled as unexpected, exogenous shocks. Id. A 
focus on the internal dynamics of terrorist organizations, however, reveals the 
extent to which recruits and funding flow to such networks as a result of gov-
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gress,34 and worst-case scenarios about the threats posed by 
terrorist networks rather than the considerable organizational 
difficulties and trade-offs our terrorist adversaries face in car-
rying out their most lethal attacks.35 
Peering inside a terrorist network may seem like a nearly 
impossible task. After all, both experience (with the failures of 
our own intelligence bureaucracies) and intuition (about terror-
ist networks’ incentives for secrecy) suggest that we can do lit-
tle more than speculate about questions such as what al 
Qaeda’s ultimate strategic objectives are and what organiza-
tional challenges it faces in achieving those objectives. Surpris-
ingly, this turns out not to be the case. In the months and years 
following September 11, senior al Qaeda strategists and sym-
pathizers disseminated documents divulging the terrorist net-
work’s aims and its internal management dilemmas.36 Some of 
these documents have been posted on the Internet; others have 
 
ernment policies. Hence, the assumption that terrorist shocks are entirely un-
predictable and unrelated to domestic government policy, rather than endoge-
nous to the settings where governments choose policies and terrorists solve 
organizational problems may be unwarranted. Depending on the nature of the 
security policy, it may actually help solve terrorists’ problems (e.g., if the costs 
fall disproportionately on minorities from among which terrorist groups seek 
to recruit, or if the alleged security policy—such as the invasion of Iraq—
makes it dramatically easier for the terrorist network to gain attention and 
resources). 
 34. See id. (stating that “[a]s the benefits of security increase due to ex-
ogenous threats such as terrorism, a well-functioning government will supply 
more security and less liberty, because the value gained from the increase in 
security will exceed the value lost from the decrease in liberty,” without con-
sidering whether governments have the knowledge or motivation to provide 
the right kind of “security” given the complexities of terrorist organizations). 
 35. See Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 
115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2533 n.56 (2006). The authors assume that “terrorist 
groups like al Qaeda seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, are more 
likely to use them, and—because they have no population or territory to de-
fend—may be immune to ‘traditional concepts of deterrence’ that permeate the 
crisis bargaining model.” Id. Although the authors have reason to question 
whether bargaining dynamics would play out the same way with ordinary na-
tion-states and terrorist networks, the discussion elides organizational com-
plexities that force terrorist networks to contend with calibrating the intensity 
of their attacks, cultivating public support (and avoiding backlash), and trad-
ing off the investment of scarce resources in procuring or developing such a 
destructive weapon compared to other imperatives. See generally BERGEN, su-
pra note 30 (describing factors important to the development of al Qaeda); in-
fra note 109 (providing additional discussion of how the mass public tends to 
affect the incentives of terrorist networks). 
 36. See infra Part I.A. 
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been recently declassified.37 When we examine these docu-
ments in the context of emerging political science literature on 
the organizational dilemmas associated with terrorist activity, 
these jihadi strategic studies (as some observers have chris-
tened them) provide a revealing portrait of al Qaeda’s goals. Al 
Qaeda emerges as an organization that delegates power and 
money to regional affiliates who carry out recruiting, terrorist 
attacks, and political organizing.38 Though it is decentralized, it 
appears still to have a coherent leadership structure and a 
cadre of strategic thinkers to chart its future course.39 Both the 
leadership and the strategists are bent on turning the organi-
zation into a social movement with broad appeal in the Muslim 
world.40 In this quest they are aided by U.S. policies that pro-
voke outrage among rank and file Muslims,41 and they are frus-
trated by the fact that some supporters have competing goals, 
like getting rich.42 
These realities play out in illicit terrorist organizations 
that are unquestionably unique. Plainly, al Qaeda and its imi-
tators differ in a host of ways from a bureaucratized nation-
state, and even to some extent from previous insurgencies and 
other illicit organizations.43 The irony is that scholars and poli-
 
 37. See infra Part I.A. 
 38. See Lawrence Wright, The Master Plan, NEW YORKER, Sept. 11, 2006, 
at 48, 50–51 (discussing the jihadists’ alleged decision to decentralize after the 
September 11 attacks). 
 39. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing al Qaeda leadership); Al 
Qaeda’s No. 2 Criticizes Bush and Pope in Video, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 2006, at 
12, available at 2006 WLNR 16955181 (describing a recent video by al Qaeda 
leader Ayman al Zawahiri). 
 40. See COMBATING TERRORISM CTR., U.S. MILITARY ACAD., HARMONY 
AND DISHARMONY: EXPLOITING AL-QA’IDA’S ORGANIZATIONAL VULNERABILI-
TIES 52–54 (2006) [hereinafter HARMONY AND DISHARMONY], available at 
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/Harmony%20and%20Disharmony%20--20CTC.pdf 
(discussing al Qaeda’s continuing attempts to become a “social movement”); 
Wright, supra note 38, at 51 (quoting Suri as declaring that “[a]l Qaeda is not 
an organization, it is not a group, nor do we want it to be . . . it is a call, a ref-
erence, a methodology”). 
 41. See infra Part II.B. 
 42. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 11, 13 (“Prefer-
ences aren’t always aligned. When they are not, the covert nature of terrorist 
groups necessarily implies that agents can take advantage of delegation to act 
as they prefer, not as their principals would like.”). 
 43. See infra Part I.B.4 (describing the administrative law analogy). Al 
Qaeda’s cavalier willingness to kill civilians is its most readily discernable dis-
tinction. Organizational polymorphism is a fact of life, affecting both the pub-
lic agencies that enforce laws as well as the licit and illicit entities subject to 
such enforcement. The point here is not to deny that fact, but to focus on 
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cymakers can only fully grasp those distinctions, and their po-
tentially subtle policy implications, after recognizing the extent 
to which terrorist networks face a class of dilemmas that re-
flect—and sometimes even mirror—those of the Defense De-
partment, the Food and Drug Administration, the National In-
telligence Director, and United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations. Indeed, when the jihadi strategic studies are read 
in the context of political scientists’ work on terrorist organiza-
tions, they reveal the extent to which terrorist networks con-
front problems that are analogous to those of our own adminis-
trative law.44 Common predicaments include delegating 
executive and quasi-legislative powers to subordinate entities, 
harnessing expertise, solving problems associated with partici-
pation and legitimacy, and adjudicating disputes. Although al 
Qaeda strategists have been forced to manage their myriad of 
internal administrative dilemmas without the precise equiva-
lent of administrative law, some strategists have occasionally 
identified the need to build the functional equivalent of bu-
reaucratized, hierarchical, and even law-like structures to 
manage their administrative problems.45 They have recognized 
the devilish trade-offs between the flexible, decentralized struc-
ture that allegedly makes the organization so dangerous and 
regularized procedures and more centralized hierarchy which 
offer substantial benefits.  
It may be tempting to ignore these parallels, but it is also 
risky. In a world where conventional wisdom stresses the alleg-
 
common organizational problems that can provide a more realistic picture of 
terrorist networks as well as the public bureaucracies with which they inter-
act. Id.; see also infra Part II.B (discussing differences between al Qaeda and 
other insurgencies). 
 44. For present purposes, the term “administrative law” is used both in 
the literal sense of a law-like system to solve administrative problems, which 
substantially overlaps with (though is obviously different from) using the term 
to describe the duties and functions of administrative law in the American 
system. Administrative law is used in a manner that encompasses procedural 
mechanisms not ordinarily considered part of administrative law but reflect-
ing substantially similar goals of mitigating arbitrary action by organizations. 
FISA’s judicial review provisions are an example of the latter category. See 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993) (discussing the effect of con-
vergence between law and social, economic, and political norms on the imple-
mentation of legal rules); infra Part III. 
 45. In some cases, al Qaeda’s leaders have actually implemented law-like 
arrangements to legitimize internal control decisions. See BERGEN, supra note 
30, at 124–25 (discussing al Qaeda’s use of Sharian courts to legitimize the de-
cision to execute the son of one of the organization’s leaders after the son was 
discovered spying on the group). 
CUELLAR_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:24:07 AM 
1314 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1302 
 
edly unique flexibility and post-modern structure of al Qaeda-
type terrorist organizations,46 citizens and policymakers would 
do well to recognize some of the parallels between our own es-
tablished institutions and these nascent ones. The more we be-
gin to see al Qaeda and its counterparts as entities struggling 
to solve their internal administrative law-related dilemmas, 
the better we can understand how to disrupt their efforts.  
And there may be a subtler, but no less important, implica-
tion. In the process of adopting a more nuanced perspective on 
the organization of terrorist networks, citizens and policymak-
ers may also better appreciate how administrative arrange-
ments help advanced industrialized nations forge reasoned re-
sponses to a wide variety of threats, whether they arise from 
food adulteration, environmental degradation, or terrorist at-
tacks. Inasmuch as organizational success depends on manag-
ing agency problems, generating information, securing legiti-
macy and participation, and adjudicating disputes, citizens and 
policymakers should understand strategic conflicts in part as a 
contest between dueling systems of administrative law. The 
United States should evaluate counter-terrorism policies in 
part based on how they affect those systems. Hence, when 
Americans evaluate the implications of presidential decisions to 
sidestep the literal terms of the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act,47 they would do well to focus on more than just the 
short-term tactical implications of the President’s decision. 
They should also weigh the price of interfering with an institu-
tional arrangement designed to mitigate the same type of in-
ternal management problem that terrorist networks are them-
selves struggling to overcome.  
The argument unfolds in three parts. Part I seeks to peer 
inside a terrorist network by examining jihadi strategic studies, 
al Qaeda documents captured and recently declassified, and po-
litical science research on the organization of terrorist activity. 
It also identifies four recurring themes that emerge from these 
sources and that appear to epitomize the behavior of insurgent 
networks committed to using terrorist tactics. Part II explores 
 
 46. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 71 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (de-
scribing a “new kind of terrorist organization”). But see Martha Crenshaw, 
Counterterrorism in Retrospect: Chronicle of a War Foretold, 84 FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS 187, 189, 193 (2005) (criticizing the idea that al Qaeda represents a 
“new” kind of terrorism). 
 47. FISA of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 101–111, 92 Stat. 1783, 1801 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
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the implications of the preceding analyses and the potential 
relevance of these implications for evaluating legal and policy 
responses to terrorism. Part III demonstrates that this exercise 
enables us to understand the extent to which strategic conflict 
is partly a contest among competing systems of administrative 
law (broadly defined), each seeking to solve internal agency, in-
formation, participation, and adjudication problems endemic to 
both complex nonstate actors and state bureaucracies. 
I.  PEERING INSIDE A TERRORIST NETWORK    
No event in recent history so vigorously forced the machin-
ery of the federal government into overdrive as the September 
11 attacks. Within hours of the terrorist strikes, Washington 
was a flurry of activity.48 Executive branch officials held count-
less emergency meetings, made spirited public statements, exe-
cuted complex diplomatic maneuvers, and took part in urgent 
internal discussions about how to respond.49 The same was true 
thousands of miles away in Afghanistan, where the Taliban re-
gime had been sheltering al Qaeda for years. At the same time 
that congressional leaders and the Bush administration were 
gearing up for legal and policy changes in the United States, al 
Qaeda’s Kabul storefront office was brimming with activity.50 
Operatives, recruits, and organizers braced for the American 
response. Anticipating the imminent reprisal attack, the or-
ganization put together a propaganda video entitled “The Big 
Job.”51 Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden wrote a long email to 
Mullah Omar, the leader of the Taliban government hosting al 
Qaeda, seeking simultaneously to reassure the Taliban about 
what would come next and to strengthen their decision to toler-
ate it: 
I would like to emphasize the major impact of your statements on the 
Islamic world. Nothing harms America more than receiving your 
strong response to its positions and statements. Thus it is very impor-
tant that the Emirate respond to every threat or demand from Amer-
ica . . . with demands that America put an end to its support of Israel, 
and that U.S. forces withdraw from Saudi Arabia. Such responses 
nullify the effect of the American media on people’s morale . . . . Their 
threat to invade Afghanistan should be countered by a threat on your 
 
 48. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 35–36. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Alan Cullison, Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 
Sept. 2004, at 55, 58, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/ 
200409/cullison. 
 51. See id. at 68. 
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part that America will not be able to dream of security until Muslims 
experience it as a reality in Palestine and Afghanistan . . . . Keep in 
mind that America is currently facing two contradictory problems: a) 
If it refrains from responding to jihad operations, its prestige will col-
lapse, thus forcing it to withdraw its troops abroad and restrict itself 
to U.S. internal affairs. This will transform it from a major power to a 
third-rate power, similar to Russia. b) On the other hand, a campaign 
against Afghanistan will impose great long-term economic burdens, 
leading to further economic collapse, which will force America, God 
willing, to resort to the former Soviet Union’s only option: withdrawal 
from Afghanistan . . . .52 
Mullah Omar was not the only one needing reassurance. 
Within al Qaeda, the response to the attack’s success was 
mixed. Some al Qaeda members expressed deep concern for 
how the U.S. response would affect the jihadi movement. Abu 
Musab al Suri, a member of the terrorist organization’s inner 
leadership and a theorist of jihad, had sparred with bin Laden 
before about the potential risks of high-profile operations. “I 
think our brother has caught the disease of screens, flashes, 
fans, and applause,” he wrote in an email to bin Laden in 1999, 
complaining about the al Qaeda leader’s penchant for prioritiz-
ing attacks generating high-profile publicity over the difficult 
work of running the training camps and smoothing over rela-
tions with the Taliban.53 Now, Suri had reason to fear that the 
September 11 attacks would imperil the rule of the Taliban, 
and the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan was central to the 
movement’s future because it provided a place to organize and 
train new recruits.54 By June 2002, even bin Laden’s son 
Hamzah had posted messages on an al Qaeda website lament-
ing al Qaeda’s post-September 11 situation.55 In response to 
these challenges—furtively exchanging messages online and 
occasionally meeting in secluded corners of Central Asia—the 
organization’s strategic thinkers set about recapturing the 
 
 52. Id. at 70. 
 53. Wright, supra note 38, at 48, 50. 
 54. Id. at 48. 
 55. Id. Bin Laden’s son exclaimed: “Oh, Father! Where is the escape and 
when will we have a home? Oh, Father! I see spheres of danger everywhere I 
look. . . . Tell me, Father, something useful about what I see.” Id. Bin Laden 
apparently replied: “Oh, son! Suffice to say that I am full of grief and 
sighs. . . . I can only see a very steep path ahead.” Id. Then, trying to dissipate 
the link between the September 11 attacks and the organization’s present 
challenges, Bin Laden laments that “[a] decade has gone by in vagrancy and 
travel, and here we are in our tragedy. Security has gone, but danger re-
mains.” Id. 
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group’s momentum and renewing its institution-building pro-
ject.56 
A. CONTEXT AND METHODS  
The arguments unleashed within al Qaeda after the Sep-
tember 11 attacks richly emphasize the dangers of treating a 
terrorist network as a monolithic entity, impervious to organ-
izational challenges, and enjoying a bountiful supply of mem-
bers guided by a single purpose. With a more textured image of 
terrorist networks, key players shaping national security policy 
would find it harder to ignore the value of peering inside a ter-
rorist network. Scholars and analysts would find it more diffi-
cult to dismiss the insights to be gleaned from closely observing 
al Qaeda’s goals, its approach to weighing the costs and bene-
fits of choosing between truck bombs or time bombs, its canoni-
cal texts and political debates, its internal compromises, and its 
plans for appealing to the public. Domestic political realities 
playing out within advanced industrialized countries some-
times discourage legislators and executive branch officials from 
fully appreciating the complexities of their terrorist adversar-
ies.57 But facing a complex adversary with competing goals and 
a range of subtle weaknesses and strengths, politicians are al-
most foolish to ignore what leaders and strategists of terrorist 
networks actually say, what social scientists have gradually 
come to understand about the internal strategies of nonstate 
actors, and what these statements and conclusions reveal about 
our adversary’s internal organizational challenges and its 
strategies to address these challenges.58 
This is precisely the strategy that the nation’s terrorist ad-
versary has pursued. Its thinkers are hard at work scrutinizing 
 
 56. See Jarret M. Brachman & William F. McCants, Stealing Al-Qaeda’s 
Playbook, 29 STUDIES CONFLICT & TERRORISM 309, 309–11 (2006); Cullison, 
supra note 50, at 64; Wright, supra note 38, at 50–51. 
 57. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Politics and the Suboptimal Provision 
of Counterterror, 61 INT’L ORG. 9, 9–11 (2007) (discussing the potentially 
suboptimal provision of counter-terrorist policy); Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 44–
48 (discussing the potentially diverging incentives of politicians and the public 
in the context of transnational security and law enforcement policy); Mark 
Schlesinger & Richard R. Lau, The Meaning and Measure of Policy Metaphors, 
94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 611, 611–14 (2000) (indicating how politicians have an 
incentive to simplify the discussion of complicated issues). 
 58. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 392 (“One of the lessons of September 
11 is that we should pay careful attention to what the jihadists are actually 
saying.”). 
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Western management texts and Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and 
Fall of the Great Powers.59 Regarding the importance of under-
standing Western administrative practices and political behav-
ior, one strategist said this: 
We urge that most of the leaders of the Islamic movement be military 
leaders or have the ability to fight in the ranks, at the very least. 
Likewise, we also urge that those leaders work to master political sci-
ence just as they would work to master military science.60 We can say 
that bargaining is a characteristic of the politics of the enemy because 
the substitute for successful bargains between them—even if they 
achieve some partial gains—is continuous war which might crush all 
of (their) interests.61 
And while an important goal in studying Western practices 
closely is to understand the weaknesses of those practices, the 
terrorist networks’ strategists also emphasize the value of lev-
eraging technocratic Western ideas about how to solve adminis-
trative challenges—challenges that are likely to prove increas-
ingly critical to al Qaeda.62 
Al Qaeda’s thinkers have good reason to focus on under-
standing their adversaries. Al Qaeda’s goals are ambitious and 
its resources are scarce. Its adversaries are complex and capa-
ble at times of tremendously nimble feats; yet, they also face 
substantial practical and political obstacles.63 Some of the ter-
rorist network’s recurring internal challenges—involving 
agency problems, filling gaps in information, and adjudicating 
disputes—have analogues in advanced industrialized coun-
tries, and even turn out to be the province of an elaborate 
body of administrative law imposing non-arbitrariness re-
 
 59. See Brachman & McCants, supra note 56, at 310. 
 60. NAJI, supra note 1, at 37–38. 
 61. Id. at 38. 
 62. Id. at 23 (“We must make use of books on the subject of administra-
tion, especially the management studies and theories which have been re-
cently published, since they are consonant with the nature of modern societies. 
There is more than one site on the Internet in which one can obtain manage-
ment books.”). The strategists betray little awareness of the complexities asso-
ciated with how larger political, economic, legal, and social circumstances 
combine to both shape the production of the Western management practices 
they lionize, as well as shape the conditions potentially allowing such practices 
to be instrumentally effective. For an interesting discussion of how macro-level 
social forces and legal practices shape the administration of organizations in 
the Middle East, see Timur Kuran, Why the Middle East is Economically Un-
derdeveloped: The Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation, 18 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 71, 82–83 (2004). 
 63. See infra Part I.B. 
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quirements and managing public participation.64 Policymak-
ers in advanced industrial democracies would be ill-advised to 
neglect a symmetrical opportunity to scrutinize terrorist net-
works’ organizational life. Such neglect would almost certainly 
diminish policymakers’ capacity to mitigate the dangers that 
some terrorist networks pose, while also limiting society’s ca-
pacity to evaluate the strategies justified in the name of dis-
rupting terrorism. 
To counter the existing dearth of attention to organiza-
tional problems in prevailing evaluations of counter-terrorism 
strategies, the sections that follow scrutinize strategic docu-
ments and studies produced by al Qaeda strategists and sym-
pathizers. This scrutiny sheds light on the organization’s goals 
and its internal administrative dynamics. I focus particularly 
on Abu Bakr Naji’s book-length study, entitled The Manage-
ment of Savagery, because of the unparalleled volume of details 
it provides about jihadi terrorist networks’ goals and chal-
lenges, and because it was published through Sat al-Jihad, the 
main organ of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.65 I also draw from ac-
counts of three other works described by some leading al Qaeda 
observers as authentic and influential jihadi strategic studies 
describing the thinking of al Qaeda affiliates. These include a 
long tract by Abu Musab al-Suri entitled Call for Worldwide Is-
lamic Resistance;66 Ayman al Zawahiri’s Knights Under the 
Prophet’s Banner;67 and a book entitled Al Zarqawi: The Second 
Generation of al Qaeda, by radical Jordanian journalist Fouad 
Hussein, which is based on sympathetic interviews with indi-
viduals such as the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi (the former 
leader of al Qaeda in Mesopotamia) and al Qaeda security chief 
 
 64. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59 (2006) 
(providing, among other things, for notice and comment in the context of most 
regulatory rulemaking proceedings, and subjecting administrative action to 
review against arbitrariness). 
 65. See Wright, supra note 38, at 52, 56; Combating Terrorism Ctr., Abu 
Bakr Naji’s THE MANAGEMENT OF SAVAGERY (2005) (unpublished document 
on file with author). 
 66. See id. at 50. 
 67. The translation of al Zawahiri’s book-length analysis of al Qaeda’s 
goals and strategies consulted here is included in LAURA MANSFIELD, HIS OWN 
WORDS: TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE WRITINGS OF DR. AYMAN AL 
ZAWAHIRI (INCLUDES KNIGHTS UNDER THE PROPHET’S BANNER AND SELECTED 
POST SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 COMMUNIQUÉS AND MESSAGES) (2006). Al Zawahiri 
is “widely credited with being the brains behind the terror infrastructure of Al 
Qaeda.” Id. at 13. Al Zawahiri’s analysis was initially serialized in a Middle 
Eastern newspaper in December 2001. Id. at 13–14. 
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Saif al Adl.68 To place these sources in context, I have also 
drawn from a growing cache of declassified al Qaeda documents 
translated and analyzed by the Combating Terrorism Center at 
the United States Military Academy,69 and from political scien-
tists’ studies (which in turn reflect qualitative, game-theoretic, 
or quantitative analyses) of the organization of terrorist net-
works.70 
It is natural to question whether such studies genuinely re-
flect al Qaeda’s position. Given the reality that al Qaeda is an 
organization subject to internal disagreement and political 
competition, it is more accurate to say that these sources are 
likely to reflect what some of the organization’s key strategists 
are thinking.71 Al Qaeda factions jockey for support within the 
organization and for recruits outside it. In doing so, they are 
almost certainly drawn to articulating visions in written docu-
ments—much like political parties or government agencies in 
advanced industrial democracies develop written justifications 
for their own policies.72 In some cases, the materials have been 
posted in known al Qaeda websites by individuals long known 
to have authored previous works published by the terrorist net-
work.73 In other cases (as with some of the declassified sources), 
documents have been captured directly from al Qaeda opera-
tives.74 Sometimes the sources provide insight into internal dis-
 
 68. See Wright, supra note 38, at 56–57; Souad Mekhennet & Michael 
Moss, In Lebanon Camp, A New Face of Jihad Vows Attacks on U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2007, at A1. 
 69. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 2–3. 
 70. See infra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 71. The claim is not that these studies are representative, in a statistical 
sense, of what a random member of al Qaeda’s leadership would think. A large 
study of available al Qaeda-related documents could prove revealing in many 
ways, though making inferences from such an analysis might prove tricky 
given the selection problems affecting the documents presently available. In-
stead, my goal here is to focus on some of the works that experts consider to be 
indicative of the major strands of thinking among some of al Qaeda’s key 
strategists, to place them in context by referring to a larger body of captured al 
Qaeda documents and political science research, and to use the process as an 
opportunity for gaining some insights (and generating theories) about the role 
of law-like administrative arrangements in strategic conflict. 
 72. Cf. Brachman & McCants, supra note 56, at 309 (“Jihadi leaders are 
surprisingly frank when discussing the vulnerabilities of their movement and 
their strategies for toppling local regimes and undermining the United States. 
Their candor is, in large part, a consequence of struggles for leadership within 
the movement . . . .”). 
 73. See Wright, supra note 38, at 53, 56 (discussing the provenance of Abu 
Bakr Naji and his likely role as a leading al Qaeda strategist). 
 74. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 2. 
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agreements within al Qaeda in particular, and among support-
ers of the jihadi movement more generally. Some favor more 
regionally focused goals culminating in the control of territory 
in the Middle East, while others (particularly some of Hussein’s 
sources) seek an eventual “clash of civilizations” with the 
West.75 In other domains, however, there is considerable over-
lap—even remarkable agreement—among these sources, and 
the themes evident therein also prove remarkably consistent 
with the analyses in political scientists’ accounts of the logic of 
terrorist organizations.76 
B. THEMES EVIDENT IN JIHADI STRATEGIC STUDIES 
1. Western Resolve and Imperial Overstretch 
Organizations nearly always claim to have a purpose.77 For 
example, some public bureaucracies ostensibly aim to protect 
the environment through regulatory policies, while some clan-
destine insurgent groups claim responsibility for casting off the 
yoke of a brutal colonial occupation. To understand any collec-
tive entity which claims for itself the mission to accomplish 
particular goals, one should know something about its alleged 
objectives.78 
Jihadi strategists repeatedly place among their most im-
portant strategies to carefully manage public reactions in 
Western democracies. In particular, the strategists see oppor-
tunity in the risks to the United States and its Western allies of 
what could be termed imperial overstretch, where the burdens 
of commanding the affairs of distant lands begins to weaken 
the government and the economy. This trope bears some re-
semblance to the account Paul Kennedy provides in The Rise 
and Fall of the Great Powers, in which empires crumble be-
cause of the staggering financial, geostrategic, and logistical 
 
 75. See Wright, supra note 38, at 57–59 (discussing differences between 
the more nationalistic activists focused on securing control of Arab countries, 
and comparing their purpose to the dark utopian vision of conflict in Hussein’s 
book). 
 76. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 77. See JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 22 (2d ed. 
1993) (“Roles in organizations, as contrasted with many of the other roles that 
individuals fill, tend to be highly elaborated, relatively stable, and defined to a 
considerable extent in explicit and even written terms.”). 
 78. This is not the same as assuming those objectives fully explain what 
organizations actually seek to do. See generally Cohen et al., supra note 21, at 
702–12. 
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burdens of maintaining their imperial capabilities.79 A second 
and related theme is the goal of making Western republics suf-
ficiently sensitive to these burdens to provoke a political de-
mand for disengagement from the Muslim world. They find his-
torical support for this possibility in the U.S. experience with 
Vietnam and Somalia, and Soviet Russia’s debacles in Afghani-
stan. In one jihadi strategic tract, Abu Bakr Naji makes these 
points by quoting Paul Kennedy himself: 
When a state submits—whatever the extent of its ability—to the illu-
sion of the deceptive power and behaves on this basis, that is when its 
downfall begins. It is just as the American author Paul Kennedy says: 
“If America expands the use of its military power and strategically ex-
tends more than necessary, this will lead to its downfall.” This over-
whelming power is also assisted by the cohesion [tamasuk] of the so-
ciety in the central country and the cohesion of that society’s 
institutions and sectors. The overwhelming military power (weapons, 
technology, fighters) has no value without the cohesion of society and 
the cohesion of (society’s) institutions and sectors. But this over-
whelming military power may become a curse to this great super-
power if the cohesion of society [literally “the social entity”] col-
lapses.80 
Bin Laden’s aforementioned email to Mullah Omar immedi-
ately after the September 11 attacks voices similar hopes to 
[a]ttempt to cause a rift between the American people and their gov-
ernment, by demonstrating the following to the Americans: That the 
U.S. government will lead them into further losses of money and 
lives. That the government is sacrificing the people to serve the inter-
ests of the rich . . . . That the government is leading them to the war 
front to protect Israel and its security. America should withdraw from 
the current battle between Muslims and Jews.81 
While the strategists sometimes differ in the extent to 
which they believe imperial overstretch to be essentially inevi-
table, they often highlight the importance of undertaking vio-
lent resistance operations that will encourage Westerners to 
tire of involvement in the Middle East and the Muslim world.82 
They also highlight an additional benefit of the controlled use 
of violence: it helps to puncture the myth that Western forces 
 
 79. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS 100 
(1987) (discussing the weaknesses of the French and Russian empires). 
 80. NAJI, supra note 1, at 7. 
 81. Cullison, supra note 50, at 70. 
 82. NAJI, supra note 1, at 38 (“As for [the Americans’] persistence in con-
tinuing war, that is only when they think that their opponent is weak and it is 
possible to crush his will. When there is violent resistance which leads to inva-
sions that cost a great deal and are of little use, the factions of the coalition 
began to withdraw one after another preferring (their own) security or delay-
ing the conflict until more suitable circumstances.”). 
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generally, and the United States in particular, are invincible.83 
Thus, in an argument that echoes game theorists’ identification 
of prisoners’ dilemma problems facing those who might resist 
authorities that have greater power,84 Naji notes: 
There is no doubt that the power which God gave to the two super-
powers (America and Russia) was overwhelming in the estimation of 
humans. However, in reality and after careful reflection using pure, 
human reason, one comes to understand this power is not able to im-
pose its authority from the country of the center—from America, for 
example, or Russia—upon lands in Egypt and Yemen, for example, 
unless these (latter) countries submit to those powers entirely of their 
own accord. It is correct that this power is overwhelming and that it 
seeks help from the power of local regimes controlled by proxies who 
rule the Islamic world. Yet all of that is not enough (to completely 
control the satellite states). Therefore, the two superpowers must re-
sort to using a deceptive media halo which portrays these powers as 
non-coercive and world-encompassing, able to reach into every earth 
and heaven as if they possess the power of the Creator of creation.85 
Al Zawahiri sounds a similar theme in Knights Under the 
Prophet’s Banner, noting the extent to which Western powers 
work through local allies inveigled by the appearance of power: 
We need to admit that successful attempts have been made to infil-
trate our ranks, that these attempts have attracted some of our 
prominent names, and our enemies have added them to the crowds 
that serve their purposes, including the writers of falsehoods, those 
who exploit principles for personal gain, and those who sell their fat-
was (religious rulings) as commodities.86 
Because the Afghan experience punctured the myth of su-
perpower invincibility, it was incredibly valuable to the jihadi 
movement.87 Imperial overstretch, characterized by crumbling 
Western resolve and diminished perceptions of invincibility re-
sulting from attacks in the Middle East, yields a toxic brew 
that strategists can use to undermine Western objectives and to 
acquire converts and territory. The organization must garner 
sufficient resources, supporters, and administrative capacities 
 
 83. Id. at 9. 
 84. Cf. Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and 
the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 245 (1997) (modeling a “game the-
ory approach to . . . political officials’ respect for political and economic rights 
of citizens”). 
 85. NAJI, supra note 1, at 7. 
 86. MANSFIELD, supra note 67, at 20. 
 87. Id. at 38 (“A further significant point was that the jihad battles in Af-
ghanistan destroyed the myth of a superpower in the minds of the Muslim mu-
jahideen young men. The USSR, a superpower with the largest land army in 
the world, was destroyed and the remnants of its troops fled Afghanistan be-
fore the eyes of the Muslim youths and as a result of their actions.”). 
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to calibrate its tactics and to survive long enough to reap the 
reward of the West’s imperial overstretch, which brings us to 
the next theme. 
2. Protecting Organizational Survival 
Save in the rarest of circumstances, conflict over means, 
ends, or decision-rules is an inevitable byproduct of collective 
decision making.88 Just as members of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission or the Federal Election Commission often 
disagree about the proper content of a regulatory rule, al Qaeda 
strategists do not agree on everything. For example, Suri dif-
fers from other writers because he believes the organization 
should largely eschew high-profile attacks against Western 
targets.89 His concern is borne largely from a desire for the sur-
vival of the movement to which he is so profoundly devoted and 
from experiences where that movement faced collapse because 
of meager financial resources, captured leaders, relentless 
pressure at the hands of intelligence agencies, and the lack of 
territory from which to organize and recruit.90 
On the other hand, the disagreements are only partial. Al-
though other strategists are somewhat more willing to contem-
plate attacks against Western targets (particularly if they have 
the appealing quality of fomenting exhaustion rather than out-
rage among the Western public), they tend to share Suri’s con-
cern for organizational survival. Despite Naji’s relatively 
greater willingness to sacrifice secrecy for some of the benefits 
of a more hierarchical bureaucracy,91 he shares Suri’s view 
about the need to focus on organizational survival by learning 
from the past: 
In the beginning of the Afghani war in the [19]70s . . . the jihad went 
through critical periods in which a number of strikes were directed 
 
 88. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 132–56; Terry M. Moe, The 
New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 758–65 (1984). 
 89. See Wright, supra note 38, at 51 (“Unlike most jihadi theorists, Suri 
acknowledges the setback caused by September 11. He laments the demise of 
the Taliban, which he and other Salafi jihadists considered the modern world’s 
only true Islamic government.”). 
 90. See MANSFIELD, supra note 67, at 201 (“Victory by the armies cannot 
be achieved unless the infantry occupies the territory. Likewise, victory for the 
Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be attained unless these 
movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.”); NAJI, 
supra note 1, at 61 (discussing the value of territory); Wright, supra note 38, 
at 50 (discussing how poorly the movement was doing in the early to mid 
1990s). 
 91. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 63. 
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against the mujahids, until—according to some accounts—only thirty 
men remained. However, . . . after . . . a decade of confrontation with 
the regime . . . the jihad offered up one and a half million mar-
tyrs . . . . Where did these numbers of people come from? The response 
is that it happened by means of leading the masses to the battle and 
turning them into an army, especially when we established regions 
that were secure from the chaos and savagery that resulted from 
fighting and the people emigrated to these regions. We can make 
these regions theaters for proselytizing, training, and education.92 
Naji’s exhortation to turn adversity into opportunity is 
similarly reflected in the efforts made by al Zarqawi’s organiza-
tion in Iraq to learn from the mistakes of the al Tali’a move-
ment in Syria.93 Al Tali’a’s experience in Syria, for example, 
taught the brash entrepreneur of terrorism that organizational 
survival depended in part on the existence of a media and po-
litical arm to complement war-fighting.94 
Suri, al Zarqawi, and Naji were not alone in seeking to pro-
tect the organizational viability of the jihadi movement by ex-
tracting lessons from previous failures. Zawahiri also dwells on 
the critical imperative of learning from past mistakes in order 
to protect organizational survival, focusing particularly on os-
tensible allies of the jihadi movement that instead “stabbed . . . 
[it] . . . in the back.”95 And echoing recent empirical work in po-
litical science emphasizing the importance of geography to the 
success of insurgencies, Zawahiri notes that: 
The problem of finding a secure base for jihad activity in Egypt used 
to occupy me a lot, in view of the pursuits to which we were subjected 
by the security forces and because of Egypt’s flat terrain which made 
government control easy, for the River Nile runs in its narrow valley 
between two deserts that have no vegetation or water. Such a terrain 
 
 92. Id. at 62. 
 93. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 37. 
 94. See id. Other jihadi strategists, including Naji, agree about the impor-
tance of political activity as being central to organizational survival. See NAJI, 
supra note 1, at 37 (“If we meditate on the factor common to the movements 
which have remained, we find that there is political action in addition to mili-
tary action.”). 
 95. MANSFIELD, supra note 67, at 46 (“The Islamic movement in Egypt, 
even though it made an effort against the enemies of Islam in the past, its 
general line was not against the ruling regime but against the external enemy. 
The movement’s ideology and media continued to try to get close to the head of 
the ruling regime (the king) and to recognize him as the legitimate authority 
in the country. This arbitrary separation between the external enemies and 
their internal agents led to many disasters and setbacks because the move-
ment’s members faced their enemy with their chests but left their backs ex-
posed to his ally. Thus, they were stabbed in the back on the orders of those 
whom they faced with their chests.”).  
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made guerrilla warfare in Egypt impossible and, as a result, forced 
the inhabitants of this valley to submit to the central government and 
be exploited as workers and compelled them to be recruited in its 
army.96 
The September 11 attacks did nothing to diminish the im-
perative of organizational survival. The survival imperative 
was intensely apparent in the hectic days following the Sep-
tember 11 attacks, as operatives and leaders responded to 
American pressure and eventually decided to further decentral-
ize the organization.97 One should expect concerns about organ-
izational survival to be both profound and stable. While al 
Qaeda has produced its share of suicidal violence, the conclu-
sion that it is a suicidal organization is profoundly deceiving. 
Indeed, the organizations involved in recruiting, preparing, and 
fielding suicide bombers tend to exhibit a long-term, even 
quasi-rational, regard for their own survival which is essential 
to creating the elaborate infrastructure which supports suicide 
bombing campaigns.98 More generally, players within organiza-
tions such as al Qaeda have both politically instrumental and 
more self-regarding reasons for their movement—and indeed, 
for their particular faction or organization—to survive. 
Whether they crave some measure of political power or whether 
they seek the satisfaction of seeing like-minded individuals af-
fect the larger political environment, they are unlikely to want 
their investment in a particular organization to dissipate.99 
Moreover, their own well-being, including access to the necessi-
ties of life and support in eluding capture, depends to some ex-
tent on the organization in which they have invested.100 Fi-
nally, as Bruce Hoffman observes, terrorist organizations are 
subject to a process of natural selection, which constantly 
weakens or even decimates those that do not focus on the im-
portance of their own survival.101 
 
 96. Id. at 28. 
 97. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 392 (discussing the pressures placed on 
the organization as a result of “the loss of Afghanistan as a base, and the U.S.-
led campaign to detain members of jihadist movements around the world”). 
 98. See ROBERT PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE 
TERRORISM 20–24 (2005) (describing the strategic, social and individual logic 
behind terrorist organizations). 
 99. See infra notes 129–35 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra Part I.B (discussing the importance of public approval for 
the survival of al Qaeda). 
 101. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 157–84 (1998) (discussing 
organizational survival). Though it would be all but impossible to deny the 
importance of survival for his own organization, Abu Bakr Naji indulges his 
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3. Crafting a Long-Term Plan to Achieve (Surprisingly 
Conventional) Strategic Goals 
Terrorist organizations have reason to take the long view. 
Even by their own admission, they must surmount staggering 
difficulties to achieve their political goals, and their tactics 
sometimes require feats of extraordinary complexity. They are 
marginalized from political power yet crave the authority to 
govern.102 Al Qaeda strategists are no exception: they too live 
for the future. They emphatically reject the notion that violent 
activity is a mere outlet for pent-up frustration.103 Al Qaeda 
strategists envision a campaign that will take, at a minimum, 
decades.104 Naji’s vision, as summarized by Wright, takes the 
following shape: 
[J]ihadis [should] continually attack the vital economic centers of [re-
gimes in Muslim countries that cooperate with the West], such as 
tourist sites and oil refineries, in order to make the regimes concen-
trate their forces, leaving their peripheries unprotected. Sensing 
weakness, Naji predicts, the people will lose confidence in their gov-
ernments, which will respond with increasingly ineffective acts of re-
pression. Eventually, the governments will lose control. Savagery will 
naturally follow, offering Islamists the opportunity to capture the al-
legiance of a population that is desperate for order (Naji cites Af-
ghanistan before the Taliban as an example.) Even though the jihadis 
will have caused the chaos, that fact will be forgotten as the fighters 
 
evident sense of moral superiority when discussing how Westerners think 
about survival: 
[W]hat fuels their action are material interests and the desire to sur-
vive. Thus, they strive to survive, but it is not just any survival; 
rather it is a survival which guarantees for them an unruffled life of 
comfort and luxury. As for their allies and those who support them, 
they continue and remain steadfast in their coalition with them as 
long as (their) interest is served by that alliance. Therefore, we must 
understand this very well. 
NAJI, supra note 1, at 37 (emphasis added). 
 102. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 15–22 (discussing the goal of establishing a 
caliphate in the Middle East). As one observer notes: 
[A]ll terrorists exist and function in hopes of [acquiring the power to 
govern]. For them, the future rather than the present defines their 
reality. Indeed, they can console themselves that it was only a decade 
ago that the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, said of the 
African National Congress, “Anyone who thinks it is going to run the 
government in South Africa is living in cloud-cuckoo land.” Exactly 
ten years after that remark was uttered, Queen Elizabeth II greeted 
President Nelson Mandela on his first official state visit to London. 
HOFFMAN, supra note 101, at 184. 
 103. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 72 (discussing the problem of “idiots”). 
 104. See id. at 38. 
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impose security, provide food and medical treatment, and establish 
Islamic courts of justice.105 
Surpassing even Naji’s ambition (though overlapping with 
his account on key points), Hussein details a twenty-year plan 
for al Qaeda beginning with the September 11 attacks. The de-
tails of Hussein’s plan bear at least some resemblance to what 
the United States has experienced in the succeeding years.106 
In a stage that is to last until 2006, Iraq will become the focus 
of recruiting for foot-soldiers eager to attack the United 
States.107 Subsequently, al Qaeda will turn attention to Syria 
and Turkey, while ratcheting up direct confrontation with Is-
rael.108 The organization, gradually transforming itself into a 
decentralized social movement, will then be in a position to un-
dermine Arab governments, to bolster its capabilities to deploy 
electronic warfare, and to more openly confront the United 
States.109 
 
 105. Wright, supra note 38, at 56. 
 106. Id. at 56–58. 
 107. Id. at 57–58. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. Suri also celebrated the potential to transform jihadi organiza-
tions into the backbone of a more deeply-rooted but decentralized social move-
ment. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 245 (discussing Suri’s vision of decen-
tralization). In achieving such a goal, Suri seems to have sought not only a 
means of enlisting untold numbers into his cause but also of solving (however 
imperfectly) the hierarchy-operational security trade-off otherwise pervasively 
affecting his movement. Id. “If a Muslim is in Britain he doesn’t need to leave 
his job or university and go and fight jihad at the front. What he can do is call 
the press agency and tell them I’m from the global Islamic resistance and 
claim responsibility for whatever action is being done in the world.” Id. But 
achieving this goal is easier said than done. The problem lies in a paradox Suri 
and his like-minded pro-decentralization strategists apparently fail to ac-
knowledge. Building a movement requires broad public support, which in turn 
requires coordinated operations (particularly violent ones), a task that is 
nearly impossible without hierarchy. In principle, it is perhaps not impossible 
for al Qaeda and similar entities to innovate in the creation of postmodern or-
ganizational forms that combine attributes of hierarchy along with some of the 
benefits of decentralization (as when a central leadership sets broad goals that 
leave lower-level operatives a measure of flexibility but also constrain their 
priorities, and when resources can be spent independently by decentralized 
members but allocated centrally). Nonetheless, two observations are in order 
about such efforts. First, they are likely to require time, energy, and learning 
through mistakes (because of the technical complexities inherent in developing 
signaling systems, using technology, and otherwise harnessing the benefits of 
hierarchy when decentralization is the norm), thereby introducing large risks 
that must be weighed alongside other goals. Second, compelling theoretical 
rationales (supported by empirical observation) suggest that, even when or-
ganizations innovate in an attempt to achieve benefits of both centralization 
and hierarchy, certain inherent limits are likely to interfere with this process. 
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While the jihadi strategists differ about when to confront 
their political adversaries and how hierarchical to make terror-
ist organizations, their overarching goals are surprisingly simi-
lar. In particular, the terrorist networks appear to harbor not 
abstract ideological objectives but rather concrete strategic po-
litical and military goals. In some cases, these turn out to be 
surprisingly conventional goals relating to the accumulation of 
territory and control over commodities such as oil. For example, 
Naji writes: 
[T]he military goals of our movement in the stage of “the power of 
vexation and exhaustion” [are] especially the goal of (making) the en-
emy withdraw its forces and the forces of its helpers among the apos-
tates from specific targets and making them withdraw from places 
where they are present (especially the regions where the masses live 
so that we can begin in the stage of the management of savagery.) 
(Furthermore), in accordance with the principle of (self ) interest 
which the enemy follows . . . we must crown that (effort) by targeting 
petroleum sectors since petroleum is the artery of life in the West. . . . 
America views [oil] as a primary and vital strategic commodity in war 
and a necessity in peace and a requisite for international influence. 
The success of targeting the economy of the enemy politically and 
militarily is historically well-established . . . .110 
Naji makes similar observations regarding the value of territo-
rial control,111 echoing Suri’s emphasis on the importance of 
territory as a place to recruit, organize, train, and strategize.112 
Admittedly, actors within terrorist networks differ in the 
extent of their ultimate aspirations. Some burn with a rage 
that will only assuage with vengeance,113 while other partici-
pants in the network are more readily motivated by money114 or 
 
Hierarchy depends on formal organizational structures, division of responsibil-
ity, authority relationships, and predictable forms of interaction that are gen-
erally considered to be the antithesis of decentralization. It is more plausible 
to expect that terrorist networks will find a viable means for operational secu-
rity to exist with somewhat hierarchical arrangements than to expect terrorist 
networks to discover some entirely unique means of having their cake and eat-
ing it too by simultaneously being centralized and decentralized. 
 110. NAJI, supra note 1, at 41. 
 111. See id. at 61 (discussing the value of territory). 
 112. See Wright, supra note 38, at 50–51. 
 113. See id. at 52 (“One line of thinking proposes that America’s tragedy on 
September 11 was born in the prisons of Egypt. Human rights advocates in 
Cairo argue that torture created an appetite for revenge, first in Sayyid Qutb 
and later in his acolytes, including Ayman al-Zawahiri.”). 
 114. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 154–55 (quoting one of bin Laden’s 
most trusted lieutenants in the early al Qaeda organization in Sudan who 
stole $110,000 from him); Shapiro, supra note 28 (discussing “greedy” terror-
ists). 
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abstract political and religious convictions.115 In the midst of 
these competing agendas, leaders with a strategic vision have 
articulated a range of goals that fit onto a continuum, from ob-
taining control of existing nation-states,116 fomenting broad re-
gime change in the Middle East and creating a caliphate 
throughout the region or the Muslim world,117 to engagement 
in a long-term military and ideological struggle with the 
West.118 The most sophisticated analyses repeatedly bring the 
focus back to the concrete indicators of political and military 
success that one might expect from a more conventional nation-
state adversary.119 Assumptions that terrorist networks seek as 
their primary objective to undermine Western values may dis-
tort our capacity to appreciate how they might respond to fa-
miliar costs and benefits relating to the achievement of conven-
tional political and military goals.120 
4. Subtle Parallels Between Terrorist Networks and State 
Bureaucracies 
If there is any image that epitomizes modern national se-
curity discourse, it is that of a faceless, lawless terrorist cabal—
endlessly adaptable and antithetical to conventional rule-bound 
bureaucracies. Yet Lawrence Wright’s exhaustive study of al 
Qaeda’s origins again confounds such imagery. In its stead, 
Wright traces an image of an entity almost desperate for Webe-
rian, rule-bound bureaucratic structure: 
 The leaders of al-Qaeda developed a constitution and by-laws, which 
described the utopian goals of the organization in clear terms: “To es-
tablish the truth, get rid of evil, and establish an Islamic nation.” 
This would be accomplished through education and military training, 
as well as coordinating and supporting jihad movements around the 
world. The group would be led by a commander who was impartial, 
resolute, trustworthy, patient, and just; he should have at least seven 
years of jihad experience and preferably a college degree. Among his 
duties were appointing a council of advisors to meet each month, es-
tablishing a budget, and deciding on a yearly plan of action. One can 
appreciate the ambition of al-Qaeda by looking at its bureaucratic 
 
 115. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 98–99 (interviewing a Libyan recruit 
about his ideological motivations for joining al Qaeda). 
 116. See supra Part I.B. 
 117. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 15–22. 
 118. See Wright, supra note 38, at 56. 
 119. See id. at 57–58. 
 120. See supra note 32 (comparing the Bush administration’s assertions 
about the motivations of terrorist networks with a more scholarly historical 
analysis of terrorist groups). 
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structure, which included committees devoted to military affairs, 
politics, information, administration, security, and surveillance.121 
This picture of an embryonic al Qaeda, steeped in legalisms 
and bureaucratic procedures, showcases the importance terror-
ist networks assign to institution-building. Time and again, 
terrorist leaders ponder how to simultaneously solve their most 
pressing short-term management problems, while instilling a 
sense of shared mission among members and forging proce-
dures achieve their organizations’ longer-term goals. Indeed, 
perhaps the most common recurring theme in the jihadi strate-
gic studies concerns the central importance of creating a struc-
ture to solve organizational challenges. How should camps be 
run? Who should decide what operations are undertaken? Who 
makes decisions about how best to resolve disputes? How 
should work be delegated? How should differing opinions be 
harmonized? While a terrorist network’s specific operational 
challenges are distinctive, its larger organizational dilemmas 
are not. 
To see this, consider how the jihadi strategic studies em-
phasize the importance of service-delivery to the growing popu-
lations they expect to control.122 Some strategists recognize the 
need for effective administrative cadres to manage oversight 
responsibilities and particularly to ensure the delivery of ser-
vices to civilian populations that come under the organization’s 
control.123 Not surprisingly, al Qaeda’s vision of eventually ad-
ministering the security, sustenance, and economic needs of a 
population would encompass the same burdens that a conven-
tional public agency would encounter in providing services, in-
cluding the need to recruit competent staff and to respond to 
the needs of the population being served. And crucial among 
these burdens is the need for managers. As Naji notes: 
[We have a need for] a large number of elements who have adminis-
trative experience, especially in the first periods of the management 
of savagery. Of course, we have previous experience from managing 
our organized groups. However, when we settle in the regions, our 
administrative elements will not be sufficient with respect to num-
bers for managing these regions, whose large numbers of residents 
will take us by surprise. The regions of savagery should be managed 
by us and by the people who live in them.124 
 
 121. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 142.  
 122. See Wright, supra note 38, at 56. 
 123. NAJI, supra note 1, at 63. 
 124. Id. Note that Naji offers a somewhat more elaborate vision than al 
Zawahiri’s, which hints at the ability of a terrorist network to take over a 
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Notwithstanding al Qaeda’s ultimate and radically anti-
Western goals, the basic insight ought to be familiar to anyone 
involved in planning for post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq or 
similar settings on behalf of the U.S. government. 
Of course, the administrative cadres to which Naji refers 
are just one type of expert. In order to manage the period of 
“savagery” that Naji foresees and effectively provide services to 
civilians, the strategist readily anticipates the need for al 
Qaeda to deploy even more specialized expertise: 
One of the brothers said to me . . . “This [territorial expansion] is not 
the way that will take us to our goals. Assuming that we get rid of the 
apostate regimes today, who will take over the ministry of agricul-
ture, trade, economics, etc.?”. . . . [I]t is not a prerequisite that the 
mujahid movement has to be prepared especially for agriculture, 
trade, and industry. One even sees that the movements and the parties 
which come to power in the world govern on the basis of their political 
constituents. They appoint ministers from within the party or the 
movement for managing the different ministries and for taking 
charge of general policy for each ministry in accordance with the gen-
eral policy of the state. As for the one who manages the techniques in 
each ministry, he can be a paid employee who has no interest in pol-
icy and is not a member of the movement or the party. There are 
many examples of that . . . .125 
Many examples, indeed: unfamiliar though his context may be 
to external observers, Naji might as well have been providing a 
theoretical account of representative politics and bureaucratic 
delegation that underlies the conventional administrative 
state. 
Solving management problems is relevant not only when 
terrorist networks enter their hoped-for “management of sav-
agery” phase. Taxing Western resolve, seeking organizational 
survival, and executing their long-term plan to create the pre-
conditions for the management of savagery all require re-
sources and recruits.126 Achieving these objectives requires cali-
brating violence and navigating the devilishly difficult trade-
 
state’s administrative apparatus essentially intact. See supra Part I.B.; cf. An-
drew Rathmell, Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We 
Learn?, 81 INT’L AFF. 1013, 1022 (2005) (discussing the problems that followed 
from U.S. planners’ apparent assumption that they could take over the Iraqi 
government’s administrative apparatus essentially intact). In contrast, Naji 
appears more willing to recognize service delivery and governance as a stag-
gering challenge. NAJI, supra note 1, at 63. 
 125. NAJI, supra note 1, at 63 (emphasis added). As for the time it would 
take to explain, a semester’s worth of administrative law would probably do 
the trick. 
 126. Id. 
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offs between operational security and innovation on the one 
hand and centralized control on the other. From an instrumen-
tal perspective, jihadist leaders would therefore view some of 
the challenges faced by public organizations and their leaders 
with considerable familiarity before the “management of sav-
agery” phase. 
Intricate contextual details unquestionably affect how any 
collective entity fashions an instrumental response to its organ-
izational problems. Yet the underlying internal organizational 
problems have a common root, even in staggeringly different 
contexts. Public bureaucracies routinely face agency problems 
involving the alignment of goals between principals (political 
actors or agency managers) and agents.127 Jihadi strategists 
foresee similar challenges, given the ambitious nature of their 
goals and the frequently demonstrated temptation of lower-
level operatives to skim financial resources.128 Both types of or-
ganizations must adjudicate disputes and explicitly turn to le-
gal procedures to do so.129 Like public bureaucracies, al Qaeda 
and its analogues also face the problem of restraining overzeal-
ous action. The language of some jihadi strategic studies even 
eerily parallels words in American judicial opinions recognizing 
the importance of administrative mechanisms to mitigate such 
overzealous behavior.130 Commonalities emerge as well in how 
terrorist networks and public bureaucracies in the U.S. public 
law system—faced with the need to restrain overzealous action 
while harnessing expertise131—view management through 
 
 127. See KAREN M. HULT & CHARLES WALCOTT, GOVERNING PUBLIC OR-
GANIZATIONS: POLITICS, STRUCTURES, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 15–24 
(1990) (describing characteristics of the different models of the organization as 
a political system). 
 128. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing examples of 
“greedy” terrorists). 
 129. See, e.g., BERGEN, supra note 30, at 124–25 (discussing al Qaeda’s use 
of Sharian courts to legitimize its decisions); HULT & WALCOTT, supra note 
127, at 44–45 (discussing prominent adjudicative structures within public or-
ganizations). Although both types of entities deploy formal legal rules, it is un-
surprising that an illicit nonstate entity does so less frequently given the lack 
of a larger social, political, and bureaucratic context that would enable it to 
more fully acquire the attributes of a conventional nation-state. 
 130. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 61 (discussing the need to restrain certain 
groups from being excessively aggressive); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Audit-
ing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 258–60 (2006) (discuss-
ing the role of judicial review in restraining overzealous action among public 
bureaucracies). 
 131. See, e.g., Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952) 
(“[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of 
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strict and hierarchically imposed rules. Terrorist networks face 
an even more difficult trade-off than public bureaucracies in 
contending with hierarchy. This is because formal bureaucratic 
hierarchies value carefully administering scarce resources, a 
practice which can lead to particularly pronounced security 
problems.132 But more striking than the distinctions in the in-
tensity of the dilemma is the reality that such profoundly dif-
ferent types of organizations as public bureaucracies and ter-
rorist networks nonetheless view hierarchy and formal rules as 
both a blessing and a curse. 
Finally, although some strands of conventional wisdom re-
gard terrorist organizations as entirely unconstrained by public 
reactions,133 a closer examination reveals that both public agen-
cies and terrorist networks seek to build public approval and 
gain legitimacy.134 Terrorist networks can be constrained by 
their audiences in two crucial ways. First, leaders’ tactical and 
egotistic political objectives depend on the internal support of 
participants, and that dependence requires leaders to employ 
strategies that engage and reward these constituents.135 Sec-
ond, the appeal of a terrorist network to the public (particularly 
in Middle Eastern countries) is pivotal because it cultivates 
greater organizational support and assuages opposition to the 
group’s objectives.136 This connection between public support 
 
judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies 
created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed 
over.”); NAJI, supra note 1, at 25 (“[I]n our plan we open the door of manage-
ment wide to those who have mastered its art.”). 
 132. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 244–46 (discussing Suri’s critique of 
hierarchy). 
 133. See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 35, at 2533 (contending that “terrorist 
organizations face . . . no political accountability for their foreign policy fail-
ures,” and that therefore “they can afford to ignore their domestic audiences 
and take more aggressive stances in initiating international conflict”). 
 134. Compare Kallstrom v. Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1065 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(discussing the value of transparency and public accountability for both the 
judicial and executive branches), and DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF 
BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 366 (2001) (stating that much of the FDA’s present 
power is derived from the public legitimacy and prestige that it gained early in 
its history as it “acted to stem vast consumer crises in adulterated medicines”), 
with NAJI, supra note 1, at 21 (“[T]he masses . . . will be our support in the fu-
ture, provided that there is transparency in this plan and even an acknowl-
edgement of error sometimes.”). 
 135. See Brachman & McCants, supra note 56, at 315 (discussing the in-
ternal power struggles within terrorist organizations). 
 136. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 63–64 (discussing the importance of popular 
support in establishing a successful Islamic revolution). Indeed, al Qaeda 
strategists recognize that the need for public support extends not only to what 
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and the mitigation of internal management problems may 
explain why some of the most contentious disagreements 
among terrorist leaders involve the question of how to culti-
vate broader public support.137 It also explains why leaders 
temper their authoritarian impulses for tight control and secu-
rity with an approach that values the legitimacy created by 
law-like administrative procedures.  
Ignoring the terrorist networks’ public constraints may dis-
tort counter-terrorism policy by downplaying the value of and 
potential for driving a wedge between terrorist leaders and 
their actual or potential supporters. Juxtaposing conventional 
public bureaucracies from advanced industrialized nation-
states with nonstate actors deploying terrorist tactics is coun-
terintuitive. Yet both share a tangle of common organizational 
problems that provide insights into the nature of strategic con-
flict which transcend the more superficial ideas about terrorist 
networks that prevail in much of the current political dis-
course. 
As with any analogy, certain limits govern the comparison 
between problems confronting modern terrorist networks and 
those that bedevil conventional, rule-bound state bureaucra-
cies. Illicit nonstate actors must sometimes adopt more costly 
organizational strategies than legitimate governmental agen-
cies. For example, the risk of detection may force a terrorist 
leader to confer greater independence to subordinates than 
would otherwise be desirable.138 Furthermore, illicit organiza-
tions must do without a formal legal system. With few excep-
tions, they lack the depth of expertise and bureaucratic capac-
ity of a nation-state.139 Public bureaucracies in advanced 
industrialized countries rarely face the range of constraints 
that terrorist networks do, leaving agency leaders with a 
broader range of options to solve their bureaus’ management 
problems.  
 
the jihadi movement would have to achieve during the “management of sav-
agery” stage, but also to what the organization would need at a more embry-
onic stage in the development of a terrorist network. See BERGEN, supra note 
30, at 392 (quoting al Zawahiri’s call to win over greater public support for al 
Qaeda); supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 137. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 38, at 53. 
 138. See Jacob N. Shapiro & David A. Siegel, Underfunding in Terrorist 
Organizations (Nov. 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript at 7, on file with au-
thor). 
 139. NAJI, supra note 1, at 63. 
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In the end, a more nuanced analysis reveals critical com-
monalities that are at least as important as the differences. 
Both terrorist networks and our own bureaucratized nation-
state must strike a balance between hierarchy and expertise, 
simultaneously drawing on the strengths of each while trying 
to minimize their dependence on them.140 Both must reconcile 
the potential disconnect between low-level players and their 
superiors.141 Both must deal with problems involving bounded 
rationality and tunnel vision.142 And both must encourage par-
ticipation while maintaining critical operational attributes such 
as secrecy and restraint.143 In light of these parallels, what 
makes terrorist strategists such as Naji particularly insightful 
is that they recognize that many of their movement’s strategic 
goals—including the exploitation of imperial overstretch and 
the survival of organizational structures—all depend on the 
fate of the network’s administrative capacity.144 
If one casts aside the more superficial descriptions of ter-
rorist organizations, certain tentative implications begin to 
emerge. Jihadi terrorist networks simultaneously seek to 
achieve ambitious goals, such as provoking Western overstretch 
or competing with established governments in delivering ser-
vices to civilian populations while facing complicated organiza-
tional realities. This combination of environment and aspira-
tion gives rise to recurrent administrative law-type problems—
 
 140. Compare HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 12–13 (noting 
that the balance between hierarchy and expertise must be struck as a conse-
quence of security concerns), with HULT & WALCOTT, supra note 127, at 92–93 
(explaining that bureaucracies exist to develop organizational expertise, but 
that hierarchy is often imposed as a means of enhancing accountability). 
 141. Compare HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 19–21 (dis-
cussing how terrorist groups deal with the problem of “preference divergence” 
within their membership), with MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 13–14 (dis-
cussing the preference divergence problem more generally in the context of 
large legitimate organizations). 
 142. Compare NAJI, supra note 1, at 71 (complaining of operatives who 
cannot conceive of undertaking small missions instead of larger ones), with 
MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 173–74 (discussing how departmentaliza-
tion can lead to the emergence of subgoals which limit the overall rationality 
of agency actions). 
 143. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 245–46 (outlining Suri’s lecture on the 
importance of a decentralized cell structure as a mechanism for maintaining 
secrecy and security); NAJI, supra note 1, at 71 (“[T]he desire for large actions, 
especially battle, overcomes the minds of some . . . enthusiastic peo-
ple . . . . However, one of its harmful effects is that it moves them to scorn ac-
tions that are not large.”). 
 144. NAJI, supra note 1, at 23. 
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problems borne from the amount and complexity of coordinated 
effort that leaders must expend to achieve their objectives in a 
complicated world,145 and similar to those concerns existing at 
the core of domestic administrative law in a nation such as the 
United States. The problems involve delegation and oversight, 
expertise, participation, restraint of overzealous action, and ad-
judication of disputes.146 Much like the managers of state bu-
reaucracies in advanced industrialized countries, the nominal 
leaders of terrorist networks cannot assume the existence of op-
timal institutional conditions such as the alignment of the 
goals of low-level operatives with those of strategic decision 
makers. They must instead forge that alignment from the im-
perfect materials available to organizational entrepreneurs: 
raw recruits, imperfect monitoring strategies to oversee the 
work of low-level operatives, limited financial resources, and 
the ability to devise rules and standards that embody organiza-
tional goals.147 A more nuanced view of institutional dynamics 
reveals the organizational complexity of illicit nonstate actors 
who aim simultaneously to exhaust Western resolve, to ensure 
organizational survival, and to execute an ambitious long-term 
plan for achieving territorial control. This complexity under-
mines the assumptions made by some scholarly observers of 
terrorism-related legal developments.148 Just as it is dangerous 
to assume that public agencies routinely achieve their stated 
goals, policymakers should be wary of presumptions that ter-
rorist networks have routinely solved their own organizational 
problems. We should instead turn our attention to learning 
from al Qaeda’s administrative law dilemmas, so that we might 
better address our own. 
II.  LEARNING FROM AL QAEDA’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
DILEMMAS    
Having traced some of the themes that appear in the works 
of al Qaeda strategists, we can now use them to evaluate poten-
tial changes to our own law and policy. In particular, we can 
observe how the recurring themes emphasize certain features 
of terrorist networks that are sometimes overlooked when poli-
 
 145. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON 
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 1 (Comm. Print 1960). 
 146. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 2. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See, e.g., supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
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ticians shape public perceptions. Since politicians’ craft their 
statements and policy pronouncements to appeal to the public’s 
prevailing views,149 conventional assumptions about the uni-
form zeal of terrorist organizations, their time horizon, their in-
terest in using weapons of mass destruction, and their aptitude 
for working in secrecy may confound our collective ability to 
manage terrorist risks at a reasonable cost. As an alternative to 
the more common, truncated depiction of terrorist networks in 
discussions about appropriate legal and policy responses, this 
Part discusses some of the implications that arise from dissect-
ing al Qaeda’s administrative law-related problems. 
A. AGENCY PROBLEMS AND INFORMATION GAPS 
One challenge permeating the administrative state in-
volves gaps in information.150 Political actors in the legislatures 
and the executive branches of such states face substantial un-
certainty. How is the Food and Drug Administration using its 
regulatory powers? How reliable is the Department of Home-
land Security’s rationale for deciding not to process asylum ap-
plications from certain countries? What is the best way of 
changing the public’s nutritional or highway safety practices? 
To manage these problems, the administrative state balances 
the benefits of discretion with those of review.151 It provides for 
deferential judicial review of executive branch decisions, forces 
Congress to delimit the bureaucracy’s powers so courts can 
monitor agency activities,152 and grants private parties the lim-
ited right to learn about government policies through the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information 
Act. These measures survive in the U.S. system because politi-
cians think the measures can reduce agency problems and (to a 
lesser extent) because the public occasionally supports such 
policies.153 
 
 149. Cf. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The International Criminal Court and 
the Political Economy of Antitreaty Discourse, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1629 
(2003) (“[P]oliticians’ treaty-related rhetoric shapes public opinion, but that 
opinion in turn shapes what politicians choose to emphasize to please key con-
stituencies.”). 
 150. See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 416–17. 
 151. See Frug, supra note 29, at 1301–02. 
 152. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (re-
quiring Congress to make a clear textual commitment of authority to agencies 
whenever it “alter[s] the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme”). 
 153. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 180, 215 (1999) (arguing that Congress enacted the 
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For the leaders of terrorist networks, the information pre-
dicament is exacerbated by the rudimentary nature of their in-
ternal procedures and by the constraints of their security envi-
ronment.154 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
recurring problem of managing people and money to ensure ac-
tion in accordance with the network’s overall goals. Time and 
again, the strategists of terrorist organizations recognize that 
some members are motivated in part by the possibility of per-
sonal gain. For example, in 1999, leaders asked for an account-
ing from a Yemeni cell leader who had been provided with 
funds. In response to the report provided, he received the fol-
lowing email from Ayman al Zawahiri, already one of al 
Qaeda’s major figures: 
With all due respect, this is not an accounting. It’s a summary ac-
counting. For example, you didn’t write any dates, and many of the 
items are vague. The analysis of the summary shows the following:  
1-you received a total of $22,301. Of course, you didn’t mention the 
period over which this sum was received. Our activities only benefited 
from a negligible portion of the money. This means that you received 
and distributed the money as you please . . . 2-Salaries amounted to 
$10,085—45 percent of the money. I had told you in my fax. . . . That 
we’ve been receiving only half salaries for five months. What is your 
reaction or response to this? 3-Loans amounted to $2,190. Why did 
you give out loans? Didn’t I give clear orders to Muhammad Saleh 
to . . . refer any loan requests to me? We have already had long dis-
cussions on this topic . . . .155 
Such bickering over financial resources belies the stereo-
typical image of terrorist networks that are uniformly popu-
lated by cadres of operatives desperately eager to die for their 
cause. Instead, the picture that emerges from such exchanges is 
one of a network capable of raising considerable sums of money 
but uncertain about how, by whom, and to what degree of effi-
cacy that money will be used. If the Yemeni leader had actually 
portrayed the stereotypical perception of a religious zealot 
whose only purpose is to serve a dark organizational master, 
then Zawahiri’s exasperated email hinting at the misuse of 
funds would hardly have been necessary.156 In other examples, 
 
APA in order to control the actions of agency administrators who might be ap-
pointed by presidents of the other political party). 
 154. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 11; Shapiro & 
Siegel, supra note 138, at 6. 
 155. HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 42; Cullison, supra 
note 50, at 62, 64. 
 156. This is similar to a long-running federal case involving the financial 
mismanagement of Indian funds which features a federal judge displaying 
similar degrees of exasperation with federal officials. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
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strategists almost seem to take pains to excuse their less-than-
perfect supporters (while suggesting that the transgressions of 
those supporters should be kept secret), reinforcing the stereo-
type of the monolithic terrorist organization.157 
Ironically, even the early history of al Qaeda amply reveals 
its leadership’s pragmatic bent. During the 1980s, when the or-
ganization’s leadership was holed up near Khost, Afghanistan, 
bin Laden and his allies recognized that many potential re-
cruits would seek something more than spiritual deliverance. 
In response they designed an employment program that pro-
vided for members’ decidedly material needs: 
Al Qaeda held its first recruitment meeting in the Farouk camp near 
Khost, Afghanistan. . . . New recruits filled out forms in triplicate, 
signed their oath of loyalty to bin Laden, and swore themselves to se-
crecy. In return, single members earned about $1,000 a month in sal-
ary; married members received $1,500. Everyone got a round-trip 
ticket home each year and a month of vacation. There was a health-
care plan and—for those who changed their mind—a buyout option: 
They received $2,400 and went on their way. From the beginning, al-
Qaeda presented itself as an attractive employment opportunity for 
men whose education and careers had been curtailed . . . .158 
Al Qaeda’s leadership certainly would welcome the oppor-
tunity to dispense with the monetary incentives. In the process, 
it could avoid depending on anyone other than individuals who 
are entirely committed to the organization’s cause.159 The ter-
rorist leaders may even agree with James Landis’s observation 
that “[t]he prime key to the improvement of the administrative 
process is the selection of qualified personnel. Good men can 
make poor laws workable; poor men will wreak havoc with good 
laws.”160 
But those improvements are easier said than done. Most 
individuals harbor mixed motives for engaging in political ac-
tivity.161 Once the religious rhetoric is privately put aside, some 
 
Judge Lamberth’s Reign of Terror at the Department of Interior, 56 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 235, 241 (2004) (describing a judge’s discontent with the Treasury and 
Interior Departments, leading to multiple contempt proceedings). 
 157. NAJI, supra note 1, at 35 (warning leaders not to criticize the imper-
fections of their volunteers, and telling them to avoid publicizing errors).  
 158. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 141–42. 
 159. HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 42–43 (advising 
against the removal of less committed operatives and strengthening the net-
work as a result). 
 160. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON 
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 66 (Comm. Print 1960). 
 161. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 83–85. 
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supporters of jihadi movements are especially happy if the or-
ganization provides them with an opportunity for financial 
gain, but may become cautious or unreliable if they feel ex-
posed to personal danger.162 Even if the world were filled with a 
large number of individuals who would be fanatically loyal al 
Qaeda members, it would not obvious who they were. Almost 
any successful effort to identify them would require placing 
them in positions of intermediate responsibility and observing 
their performance.163 
Moreover, al Qaeda not only needs adherents, but also re-
quires expertise and resources. The network must sift through 
pools of potential recruits to find collaborators who can raise, 
transfer, and administer financial resources; who can forge a 
communications strategy; and who can procure commodities 
such as explosives or weapons. Thus, the organization expands 
its recruitment circle beyond those who are most intensely 
committed to the organization.164 Weapons and explosives traf-
fickers, money launderers, communications specialists, indi-
viduals with valid documents or the ability forge them, and 
those with experience living in Western countries are all likely 
to display a mix of loyalties, including those to their own mate-
rial and personal well-being.165 And the most radical and loyal 
adherents might be drawn into particularly sensitive or special-
ized roles, such as serving on suicide missions, that would pre-
clude their generalized use through out the network. For all 
these reasons, the organization confronts repeated and perva-
 
 162. See Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 138, at 13 (“[T]he longer individuals 
remain in [a terrorist] organization, and the further they move up the man-
agement structure, the more likely they are to place a heavy weight on mone-
tary rewards. . . . [T]he threshold level of risk acceptance and commitment re-
quired for participation in support activities is much lower than for 
participation in technical roles.”). 
 163. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 59–61. But see HARMONY AND 
DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 15. 
 164. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 63; Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 138, at 11–
12. 
 165. These agency problems, moreover, make it easier to understand the 
jihadi strategic studies’ frequent focus on the importance of ideological indoc-
trination. E.g., NAJI, supra note 1, at 59; Wright, supra note 38, at 48. How-
ever, even that strategy is unlikely to ensure organization-wide orthodoxy. See 
MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 59–61 (noting that departmentalization 
leads to the creation of subgoals which may not further the overall organiza-
tional objectives). 
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sive problems arising from the divergence between the organi-
zation’s goals and the goals of some of its operatives.166 
The tensions that arise from this disconnect are merely an 
example of a more general problem. Incomplete information 
limits the ability of the leaders of a terrorist network to assess 
the network’s current tactical position. Those leaders have dif-
ficulty acquiring precise information about the potential effects 
of the group’s attacks on the political and military environ-
ment, the progress made by adversaries in the pursuit of major 
leaders, and the activities and whereabouts of subordinates.167 
Information gaps hinder the organization’s efforts to set strate-
gic goals and work toward them. These gaps also create obsta-
cles to resolving basic management problems such as those 
arising from the operation of training camps or in the planning 
of responses to potential enforcement operations. From a more 
parochial perspective, factions within the organization need in-
formation to better manage political competition.168 These in-
formation needs are analogous to our own system, which is why 
so much of modern administrative law deals with creating in-
stitutional mechanisms that produce information that justifies 
particular regulatory decisions, and why information can have 
such strategic value for both military and political adversar-
ies.169 
Much like agencies within the administrative state, a ter-
rorist network seeks to counter its information problems in a 
 
 166. Cf. Cuéllar, supra note 130, at 261 (observing that while there are 
times when the good conscious of administration officials will sometimes con-
tribute to action which is in line with institutional objectives, “such desirable 
circumstances do not always arise”). 
 167. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 47; Shapiro & 
Siegel, supra note 138, at 6. 
 168. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 150 (noting that in intra-
organizational conflicts, problem solving requires an exaggerated emphasis on 
information assembly). 
 169. STEPHEN PETER ROSEN, WINNING THE NEXT WAR 253–55 (1991) (high-
lighting how uncertainty about the military capabilities of rival nations 
prompted the U.S. military to develop information through simulations); Erik 
Lichtenberg & David Zilberman, Efficient Regulation of Environmental Health 
Risks, 103 Q.J. ECON. 167, 167 (1988) (discussing environmental regulators’ 
uncertainty as to the extent of the risks associated with environmental con-
taminants); Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decision Making 
and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive 
Amendment Procedures, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 287, 287–88 (1987) (discussing 
the impact of information gaps on the incentives of politicians to organize the 
legislature into committees, and to defer to the judgments of those commit-
tees). 
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variety of ways. It could seek to promote broader participation 
to obtain more information; however, this would create addi-
tional security problems. It could attempt to infiltrate its ene-
mies.170 But, given the scarcity of operatives able to live unob-
trusively in the West,171 finding those capable of infiltrating 
Western security agencies would be very difficult. It could tar-
get individuals with special analytical capacities for recruit-
ment. Ultimately, however, none of these approaches would en-
tirely solve the problem: the environment is too complicated 
and even the most sophisticated organizations can only respond 
imperfectly to such uncertainty.172 
As a result, terrorist networks such as al Qaeda remain 
vulnerable to strategies designed to exploit their information 
gaps. Their burden is a consequence of simultaneous pressures 
to operate secretly while managing broader organizational 
problems that can be mitigated through hierarchy, expertise, 
and broader participation. In the course of walking this tight-
rope, leaders of terrorist organizations almost inevitably create 
networks of people with heterogeneous motivations.173 The 
presence of individuals who are motivated by greed or personal 
political ambition also belies the assumption that terrorist 
networks are monolithic institutions, driven uniformly by relig-
ion and ideology.174 In fact, reality is more complicated. Terror-
ist leaders must shoulder the burdensome cost of identifying 
zealous recruits while dealing with the security problems asso-
ciated with its dependence on essential, though less reliable, 
foot soldiers. 
The prevalence of mixed motives among illicit organiza-
tions leaves policymakers with a chance to drive a wedge be-
tween participants in terrorist ventures. Policymakers should 
value counter-terrorism policies that leave less-reliable mem-
 
 170. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 52 (calling on the movement to infiltrate all 
institutions associated with its enemies). 
 171. See Cullison, supra note 50, at 61. 
 172. See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 2 (indicating a trade-off between solving 
information problems and promoting security).  
 173. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 43. To avoid creat-
ing a pool of new recruits with heterogeneous motivations, leaders would have 
to incur two sets of costs: exceedingly elevated expenses screening potential 
participants, and high opportunity costs borne from excluding from participa-
tion eager individuals with expert knowledge, skills, personal contacts, or ma-
terial resources that can be valuable to the leaders’ vision of the organization. 
 174. Address to the Nation on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 597, 1598 (Sept. 11, 2006) (“[T]hey form a global network of extremists 
who are driven by . . . totalitarian ideology . . . .”). 
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bers of terrorist organization in place (particularly if the mem-
bers can be monitored) instead of detaining them. Allowing 
such operatives to stay in the organization forces al Qaeda to 
contend with a rank-and-file membership that is not fanatically 
committed to the group.175 Enforcement practices that fail to 
consider the implications of removing the less reliable elements 
in the al Qaeda network can unwittingly aid the organization 
by effectively assuming the burden of separating the wheat 
from the chaff. As long as less reliable operatives remain read-
ily observable (and, if necessary, subject to interception), fo-
cused surveillance may be a better strategy than a policy of de-
tention that alerts the organization to enforcement activity and 
helps it identify its most valuable members.176 Another way to 
exploit terrorist networks’ agency problems would be to credi-
bly communicate to less devoted terrorists the rewards they 
might enjoy in exchange for betraying the group.177 
B. CENTRALITY OF PUBLIC APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL 
Like administrative bureaucracies, terrorist networks de-
pend on public approval to achieve both near-term goals of sur-
viving, and longer-term instrumental goals of undermining pro-
Western Middle Eastern regimes. Accordingly, popular support 
in the Muslim world is a critical asset to al Qaeda, its affiliates, 
and the broad social movement the organization wishes to 
spawn. Indeed, the desire of some al Qaeda strategists to found 
such a movement echoes the desire of some regulatory officials 
in advanced industrialized countries to achieve their policy 
goals by leveraging public support.178 
 
 175. See Shapiro & Siegel, supra note 138, at 32–33. 
 176. HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 42. Cf. Neal K. Katyal, 
Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1381 (2003) (calling for higher sen-
tences on co-conspirators playing a minor role in a scheme to perpetrate illegal 
activity, without considering the extent to which such penalties align the in-
centives of the minor players and the ringleaders). 
 177. See id. at 43 (advocating providing an easier out for lower tier opera-
tives than “indefinite detention or death”). 
 178. See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT 388–89 (2001) (providing 
an example of a regulatory official pursuing a strategy of fostering broad social 
support). Former FDA Commissioner David Kessler was considering potential 
policies for curbing tobacco use when he had the following insight: 
I also began to think about the importance of removing the vestiges of 
social acceptability from tobacco in order to prevent future genera-
tions of children from becoming addicted to nicotine. I knew that 
changing priorities and attitudes, and ultimately creating new norms, 
is a far more complex task than achieving legislative victories, but in 
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It follows for some strategists that their plans are espe-
cially threatened by the prospect of successful U.S. government 
efforts to counter the network’s plans to build public support. 
Suri notes that the American “war of ideas” has had at least 
limited success in spurring modification of textbooks in some 
Muslim countries.179 This success greatly rankles him, and he 
emphatically calls on adherents to promote Salafi jihadism as a 
response.180 More generally, public supporters provide nearly 
all resources on which the organization relies, from financial 
backing to foot soldiers to safe houses. At the same time, West-
ern public opinion is also crucial. It may create pressure on 
Western governments to withdraw from the Muslim world, but 
is also a potentially vindictive force that strategists must not 
overly provoke.181 This tension forces al Qaeda and its sympa-
thizers to conduct operations that generate enough publicity to 
spur recruitment and financial support without alienating the 
Middle Eastern general public; likewise they must provoke ex-
haustion rather than outrage among the public in the West.  
Al Qaeda’s leadership is not ignorant of these parameters. 
For example, Naji emphasizes the centrality of a “media plan” 
to any successful operation. This plan should 
target[ ] and focus[] on two classes. The first class is the masses, in 
order to push a large number of them to join the jihad, offer positive 
support, and adopt a negative attitude toward those who do not join 
the ranks. The second class is the troops of the enemy who have lower 
salaries, in order to push them to join the ranks of the mujahids or at 
least to flee from the service of the enemy.182 
Avoiding wanton and excessive brutality is crucial to the 
success of this media strategy. Such brutality can provoke sym-
pathy for al Qaeda’s enemies or give rise to such intense out-
rage among Western audiences that “success” could imperil the 
 
the end that is probably what it takes to reduce rates of smoking. 
Id. at 388. A generation earlier, the Federal Narcotics Bureau, “faced with a 
non-supportive environment and a decreasing budgetary appropriation that 
threatened its survival, generated a moral crusade against marihuana use 
which resulted in the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act and the alteration of 
a societal value.” Donald T. Dickson, Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organiza-
tional Perspective on a Moral Crusade, 16 SOC. PROBS. 143, 143 (1968). 
 179. Wright, supra note 38, at 51. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 392 (“[W]hat [many jihadist strategists] 
are saying about September 11 is that the attacks may have been a tactical 
victory, but they were a strategic disaster because of the overwhelming re-
sponse it provoked.”); supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the strategy of provoking 
imperial overstretch). 
 182. NAJI, supra note 1, at 21. 
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organization.183 Ayman al Zawahiri espouses this principle, evi-
denced by his warning to the late al Zarqawi to curtail his bru-
tality.184 In shaping American public opinion, their key goal is 
to promote fatigue among the population—to make the public 
question why the U.S. government is spending lives and 
money.185 
Carefully calibrating the amount of brutality is also crucial 
because too much violence can alienate the terrorist network’s 
most important pool of potential support. Among Muslims in 
the Middle East—al Qaeda’s primary audience—the terrorist 
network’s leaders seek desperately to evoke sympathy and sup-
port. They endeavor to increase the flow of donations and re-
cruits. They seek allies and sympathizers to smooth the organi-
zation’s work and to promote efficient administration.186 The 
thorniest predicament for the leaders therefore emerges anew 
in nearly every strategic decision: how to achieve sufficient 
public notoriety without unleashing the sort of backlash that 
followed the two American embassy bombings in Africa, the or-
ganization’s earliest attacks against high-profile targets. As 
Lawrence notes: 
Muslims all over the world greeted the bombings with horror and 
dismay. The deaths of so many people, most of them Africans, many 
of them Muslims, created a furor. Bin Laden said that the bombings 
gave the Americans a taste of the atrocities that Muslims had experi-
enced. But to most of the world and even to some members of al-
Qaeda, the attacks seemed pointless, a showy act of mass murder 
with no conceivable effect on American policy except to provoke a 
massive response.187 
The public support enjoyed by a terrorist organization has 
a direct impact on its ability to solve the nettlesome manage-
ment problems that interfere with its ability to accomplish its 
goals. Having greater public support facilitates building exper-
 
 183. Brachman & McCants, supra note 56, at 312–13. 
 184. Wright, supra note 38, at 53 (“Zawahiri advised Zarqawi to moderate 
his attacks on Iraqi Shiites and to stop beheading hostages. ‘We are in battle,’ 
Zawahiri reminded him. ‘And more than half of this battle is taking place in 
the battlefield of the media.’”). 
 185. Moreover, note how concern for public perceptions should naturally 
translate into a desire to develop bureaucratic and administrative mecha-
nisms that both control operations and restrain excesses. See NAJI, supra note 
1, at 9 (“If the number of Americans killed is one/tenth the number of Rus-
sians killed in Afghanistan and Chechnya, they will flee, heedless of all else 
[because] . . . [t]hey [have] reached a state of effeminacy which [makes] them 
unable to sustain battles for a long period of time . . . .”). 
 186. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 187. WRIGHT, supra note 31, at 272. 
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tise within the network because a larger base of support is 
more likely to produce skilled and knowledgeable recruits who 
would otherwise have to be carefully trained or hired at rates 
calculated to ensure loyalty. Greater public support also fills 
the network’s coffers, allowing it to fund new activities, to 
enlarge its circle of supporters by providing services and secu-
rity, and to mitigate its internal management problems by oc-
casionally using money to purchase valuable expertise or ser-
vices.188 Deeper and broader support can also mitigate internal 
dispute resolution problems by making individual members 
more fungible, particularly the low- and mid-level operatives on 
which any organization depends.189 As the organization be-
comes less dependent on a smaller group of individuals, it no 
longer has to please members that would otherwise have been 
able to veto operations.190 
Certain policy implications follow from terrorist networks’ 
thirst for public support. To further their long-term goal of dis-
lodging U.S. influence in the Middle East, al Qaeda and its al-
lies gain in the short-term by drawing U.S. forces into the re-
gion. Insurgents and terrorist networks can lure U.S. forces 
into using tactics, such as those inflicting collateral damage, 
that draw the ire of Arab and Muslim communities.191 Thus, 
U.S. policymakers should weigh the potential reaction of the 
Muslim public among other factors as they craft counter-
terrorism strategies.  
The opposite point is unlikely to be lost on strategists for al 
Qaeda and its allies, whose unquestionably ruthless zeal for 
destruction must uneasily coexist with a desire to tire rather 
than enrage Western publics.192 Meanwhile, the concern with 
 
 188. E.g., MANSFIELD, supra note 67, at 257–58, 313–14; see also Shapiro & 
Siegel, supra note 138, at 11–12. 
 189. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 15. 
 190. Cf. MARCH & SIMON, supra note 77, at 61 (observing how organiza-
tional leaders can manage some of their problems by recruiting members to 
whom work can be delegated). 
 191. E.g., Kim Gamel, Troops Kill 20 in Iraq Clash, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 
2006, at A5; Jason Straziuso, U.S. Night Raid Harms Afghans’ Trust, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, at A5 (providing examples of how American military re-
sponses to actual or perceived terrorist tactics have yielded civilian casual-
ties); Press Release, U.S. Cent. Command, Civilians Wounded by Anti-Iraqi 
Mortar Attacks (Dec. 21, 2006) (on file with author); see also RICKS, supra note 
8, at 332–35 (noting how insurgents were able to provoke the First Battle of 
Falujah and the ensuing collateral damage). 
 192. See HOFFMAN, supra note 101, at 155 (noting the danger, from the 
perspective of terrorist groups, that adverse publicity of severe terrorist at-
CUELLAR_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:24:07 AM 
1348 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [91:1302 
 
tiring rather than indefinitely infuriating American public 
opinion suggests greater nuance and complexity in potential 
terrorist motivations to use weapons of mass destruction.193 
Some strategists aim to engage in sufficient violence to attract 
public support among some sympathetic Muslim and Arab 
groups,194 while avoiding the most punishing tactics that might 
risk creating sympathy for Westerners or even provoking a 
maximally brutal response imperiling the entire movement.195 
And just as leaders may be able to exploit divisions in the mo-
tives of individuals working within these organizations, poli-
cymakers may be able to confound terrorist drives for recruits 
and public support by choosing policies that contradict negative 
assumptions about the U.S. which are rampant in the Arab and 
Muslim world.196 
U.S. policymakers must contend with public opinion not 
only in the Middle East, but also among their own constituents. 
In the process, they must consider the possibility that, by seek-
ing to dilute public resolve, terrorist networks accurately per-
ceive an important feature of the interaction between the costs 
of using force and the constraints associated democratic insti-
tutions. Democracies are more likely to force their leaders to 
equilibrate the costs of a policy of military intervention with its 
perceived benefits.197 
Whether democracy can force policymakers to learn from 
terrorist networks’ organizational vulnerabilities is a different 
 
tacks “helps an outraged public to mobilize its vast resources and produces in-
formation that the public needs to pierce the veil of secrecy all terrorist groups 
require”); supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing overzealous ac-
tion and the need to restrain it among terrorist organizations). 
 193. These complexities are not routinely appreciated even by some com-
mentators on national security. See, e.g., John M. Burkhoff, The Fourth 
Amendment and Terrorism, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 911, 925 (2005) (claiming 
without support, not only that “terrorist individuals and organizations un-
doubtedly seek to obtain chemical, biological, and nuclear materials” but that 
they do so “to assist in their assaults”); supra note 35 and accompanying text 
(discussing the trade-offs terrorist organizations face in deciding whether to 
use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons). 
 194. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 15 (discussing the importance of public sup-
port in the “path to the establishment of an Islamic state”). 
 195. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing overzealous ac-
tion). 
 196. See ZACHARY SHORE, BREEDING BIN LADENS: AMERICA, ISLAM, AND 
THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 5 (2006) (citing polls and concluding that “America’s 
appeal in the Muslim world has rarely been lower”). 
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International Disputes, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 577, 577, 586–87 (1994). 
CUELLAR_4FMT 6/1/2007 11:24:07 AM 
2007] AL QAEDA’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1349 
 
question. Although policymakers have plenty of principled rea-
sons to train attention on the organizational problems affecting 
terrorist networks’ competition for public support, the last five 
years suggest that U.S. officials have not always taken these 
insights seriously.198 It may take time, bureaucratic capacity, 
or additional political support to fully appreciate the implica-
tions of these insights. And political dynamics may distort even 
the most determined efforts to develop more effective counter-
terrorist policies.199 
Ultimately we must await history’s judgment on whether 
U.S. policymakers have sufficiently mined the organizational 
complexities of al Qaeda and its analogues. But three facts sug-
gest that U.S. policymakers and the sprawling bureaucracies 
they supervise have yet to advance far enough on this path. 
First, much of their public rhetoric about al Qaeda in particu-
lar, and about terrorist groups in general, fits poorly with the 
insights arising from a close observation of al Qaeda’s ongoing 
administrative law dilemmas.200 Second, some of the strategies 
the U.S. government has pursued play into the terrorist net-
work’s hands by dovetailing almost precisely with its explicitly 
avowed strategies.201 Third, in order to apply some of the in-
sights that can be gained from studying al Qaeda’s organiza-
tional problems, we must ensure that our own bureaucracies 
are capable of assimilating such information and evaluating 
policies using new metrics sensitive to those insights. In keep-
ing with such a focus, the September 11 Commission report 
called for greater capacity to analyze open sources.202 Yet build-
 
 198. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 365–83 (stating that 
the “U.S. government must build the capacities to prevent a 9/11-scale plot 
from succeeding” and making a series of recommendations with respect to sev-
eral countries with perceived terrorist threats); RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PER-
CENT DOCTRINE 342 (2006) (“It’s five years after 9/11 [and] the country still [is 
not able] to tell everybody what [it] know[s] about the strategic targeting doc-
trine of al Qaeda.”). 
 199. Cf. Bueno de Mesquita, supra note 57, at 29–30 (discussing politicians’ 
incentives to provide less stringent counter-terrorism policies that might be 
optimal under certain conditions); Cuéllar, supra note 20, at 44–48 (discussing 
politicians’ potential incentives to signal competence by undertaking visible 
and aggressive actions while neglecting activities with longer-term payoffs). 
 200. See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions 
between political and scholarly discussions of terrorist motivations). 
 201. See Wright, supra note 38, at 59. 
 202. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 407–19 (discussing 
the importance of developing analytical capabilities to analyze both open-
source and covertly obtained information, and of integrating such informa-
tion). 
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ing such capacity, and repairing what ails existing intelligence 
bureaucracies, is only the tip of the iceberg. Security bureauc-
racies would deliver greater social value if they eschewed their 
tendency to analyze the threat of terrorism in the abstract. In-
stead, analysts’ focus should turn to the question of how spe-
cific legal and policy changes affect terrorists’ organizational 
vulnerabilities, and whether the steps our society has taken 
reasonably advance its security or instead play precisely into 
the hands of terrorist networks. Such capacity seems, at best, 
embryonic.203 
C. AL QAEDA’S DRIVE TO SOLVE ITS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
DILEMMAS 
Even a brief observation of terrorist organizations demon-
strates that these entities lack a fully functioning analogue to 
the familiar administrative law framework found in the United 
States and other advanced industrialized countries. As non-
state actors, terrorist networks have a limited ability to fully 
appropriate the functional architecture of nation-states.204 
Nonetheless, aligning the incentives of lower-level operatives 
and organizational leaders, restraining overzealous action en-
dangering the organization’s standing with the public, and 
maintaining operational confidentiality are all examples of or-
ganizational challenges that have encouraged some al Qaeda 
strategists to aspire to imitate the administrative structures of 
state bureaucracies in advanced industrialized countries.205 
In some cases, strategists have begun to realize their ambi-
tion for law-like administrative procedures within the terrorist 
network. Al Qaeda’s increasingly frenetic pace of operations 
displays evidence of occasional attempts not only to address in-
ternal administrative problems, but also to attempt to do so 
through the creation of a law-like system of adaptive proce-
dures. Though embryonic as an administrative process, the 
components of these systems seem to rely on a flexible mix of 
 
 203. Witness, for example, the Justice Department’s relative lack of de-
tailed theoretical or empirical analysis when its officials made the case for re-
newal of portions of the Patriot Act that were subject to sunsets. Cf. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, USA PATRIOT ACT: SUNSETS REPORT (2005) (identifying the expir-
ing provisions of the Patriot Act and providing analysis and argument for their 
renewal). 
 204. It is worth noting, however, that their leaders repeatedly voice the as-
piration to acquire such capacity. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 205. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 73. 
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hierarchy (whenever possible) and loose decentralization 
(whenever necessary),206 audits of lower-level officers,207 efforts 
to require specialization,208 dispute resolution bodies to admin-
ister Islamic law,209 and a decidedly Weberian effort to match 
individuals to tasks on the basis of skill.210 Al Qaeda’s leaders 
have embraced delegation—providing guidance and leaving lo-
gistical planning and financing to regional officials.211 An em-
ployment contract for potential recruits explains how the or-
ganization has developed administrative procedures for 
handling grievances and disputes that arise under Islamic 
law.212 Reviewing what al Qaeda has already accomplished, 
Naji emphasizes what the organization has learned regarding 
the value of sorting recruits by intellectual ability and compe-
tence,213 the successful division of responsibilities within al 
Qaeda units,214 and the creation of promotion systems to re-
ward those who invest in acquiring administrative skills.215 
The organization’s most exalted instrumental goals, he reiter-
ates at every turn, depend on procedures that will build on 
these developments, providing the organization with the means 
to make the most effective and legitimate use of its scarce re-
sources. 
If administrative procedures are important for the internal 
management of terrorist networks, they are even more impor-
tant for the provision of services to external constituencies. 
Perceptive strategists within terrorist networks recognize the 
value of bureaucratic administration and service delivery. They 
seek more than tentative steps toward a formal internal admin-
istrative process—particularly during or immediately following 
periods of intense violence—and recognize that these steps are 
among their most difficult, complex, and pressing challenges. 
In order to manage such challenges, al Qaeda’s strategists seek 
 
 206. See id. at 23. 
 207. See Shapiro, supra note 28, at 2. 
 208. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 23. 
 209. See BERGEN, supra note 30, at 123–25 (discussing al Qaeda’s use of 
Sharian courts). 
 210. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 23, 72. 
 211. See HARMONY AND DISHARMONY, supra note 40, at 8. 
 212. Id. at 69 (summarizing Harmony Document AFGP-2002-600045, an al 
Qaeda employment contract which, inter alia, lays out “[p]rocedures for han-
dling grievances and disputes . . . in accordance with Islamic law”). 
 213. See NAJI, supra note 1, at 72. 
 214. See id. at 23. 
 215. See id. 
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to develop administrative cadres with special competence to 
manage organizational units.216 They also seek experts to run 
the equivalent of cabinet-type ministries, and in some cases 
they openly advocate the study of Western management 
texts.217 In contrast to some U.S. military planners, these 
strategists worry not only about the proverbial day of, but also 
about the day after.218 
Underlying this concern is the recognition that administra-
tive capacity is essential both to overseeing the operations of 
the network itself (including, among other things, the planning 
of terrorist operations and the training of new recruits), as well 
as to providing services to civilians in order to maintain their 
allegiance. The process begins with brutality: 
When savagery happens in several regions—whether we administer 
them or they are neighboring regions or further away—a spontaneous 
kind of polarization begins to happen among the people who live in 
the region of chaos. The people, seeking security, rally around the 
great personages of the country or a party organization or a jihadi or-
ganization or a military organization composed of the remainders of 
the army or the police of the regimes of apostasy.219 
But it culminates in al Qaeda’s version of the administrative 
state, where success depends on 
management of . . . needs with regard to the provision of food and 
medical treatment, preservation of security and justice among the 
people who live in the regions of savagery, securing the boarders [sic] 
by means of groups that deter anyone who tries to assault the regions 
of savagery, as well as setting up defensive fortifications. (The stage 
of ) managing the people’s needs with regard to food and medical 
treatment may advance to (the stage of ) being responsible for offering 
services like education and so forth.220 
While Naji’s is perhaps the most elaborate and organiza-
tionally sophisticated vision associated with those who support 
the burgeoning movement that al Qaeda represents, it is worth 
noting that not every jihadi strategist is equally sensitive to the 
centrality of service delivery and administrative challenges. 
Take al Zawahiri’s Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. The 
senior al Qaeda leader stresses the value of recruiting new ad-
herents, publicizing the movement, and mobilizing supporters, 
using these goals as a strategic justification for massive terror-
 
 216. See id. at 1, 63. 
 217. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the value of 
Western management texts to al Qaeda). 
 218. Cf. RICKS, supra note 8, at 184. 
 219. NAJI, supra note 1, at 47. 
 220. Id. at 11. 
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ist attacks directly against the West.221 By contrast, he pays lit-
tle attention to the challenge of administering security and ser-
vice delivery in areas where existing state authority collapses. 
He assumes, instead, that the state will simply fall into the ji-
hadists’ hands after allegedly unpopular, pro-Western regimes 
begin to fail: 
The jihad movement must adopt its plan on the basis of controlling a 
piece of land in the heart of the Islamic world on which it could estab-
lish and protect the state of Islam and launch its battle to restore the 
rational caliphate based on the traditions of the prophet.222 
There is an uncanny similarity between this assumption 
and some U.S. war planners’ assumptions about Iraq. Perhaps 
the canny aspiration of some al Qaeda strategists to forge 
greater internal administrative capacity, and particularly a 
greater capacity to provide services to civilians during and after 
violent conflict, should be cause for reflection among U.S. poli-
cymakers and citizens. Despite the importance of post-conflict 
reconstruction, the U.S. government and its allies have con-
fronted major problems in forestalling civilians’ descent into 
despair in Afghanistan and Iraq. To improve the nation’s capac-
ity to manage these challenges, U.S. policymakers may need to 
forge new bureaucratic structures and international coalitions 
better able to address the security and service delivery chal-
lenges that jihadi strategists have rightly underscored. 
But despite the unquestionable need for some bureaucratic 
improvements in conventional nation-states’ security and hu-
manitarian capabilities, the most cogent implication to draw 
from terrorist networks’ organizational problems may not be 
about the need to change our domestic administrative ar-
rangements. The most important point may be a more subtle 
one; whatever their degree of apparent ideological commitment 
and political audacity, even terrorists must overcome vast or-
ganizational challenges to achieve their goals. As the next Part 
details, this ineluctable pervasiveness of organizational prob-
lems—problems that have motivated both advanced industrial-
ized nation-states and terrorist networks to seek rule-like 
mechanisms for managing administrative burdens—suggests 
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that the tactical game of counter-terrorist law and policy is em-
bedded within a longer-term, strategic struggle among compet-
ing systems to manage administrative problems. 
III.  STRATEGIC CONFLICT AS A DUEL AMONG 
COMPETING SYSTEMS TO MANAGE  
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS    
Return to the now-familiar debates about specific legal 
changes in the wake of the September 11 attacks. These de-
bates are familiar not only because of the significance of the le-
gal changes in question, but also because the discussions tend 
to rely on three familiar approaches. One focuses on the poten-
tial tactical advantages that a new statute or constitutional in-
terpretation would yield in the battle to detect potential terror-
ist activity,223 another on the new policy’s effect on civil 
liberties,224 and a third on trying to weigh the tactical advan-
tages against the intrusions.225 Though each of these ap-
proaches has something to offer,226 each also neglects a more 
institutionally sensitive approach to evaluating the appropriate 
legal response to national security risks—an approach that 
emerges more clearly from the following insight. Despite their 
staggering differences, state bureaucracies in advanced indus-
trialized countries and terrorist networks such as al Qaeda 
have something in common. Administrative problems are en-
demic to both, and hierarchical, law-like arrangements have 
been appealing (in varying degrees) to both. Neither commonal-
ity should be surprising upon reflection—achieving ambitious 
goals is all but impossible except through organized action, and 
undertaking such action without a measure of hierarchy and 
process is profoundly difficult. It follows that strategic competi-
tion is partly about the performance of administrative systems, 
and in particular, about how well those systems manage organ-
izational problems. Even when competition occurs between 
seemingly radically different adversaries, such as advanced in-
dustrialized countries and terrorist networks, in some respects 
the underlying conflict might resemble a duel among adminis-
 
 223. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 224. See David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s 
Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1759–60 (2004). 
 225. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 33, at 1110–14. 
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trope. See supra Part II.B. 
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trative systems designed to lift an entity closer to achieving its 
goals while managing internal organizational problems. 
To see how this insight applies in the continuing struggle 
against al Qaeda and similar groups, recall how time and 
again, problems that fall under the purview of administrative 
law in the American system prove central to terrorist networks’ 
capacity to manage strategic conflicts.227 These problems in-
clude restraining overzealous action, managing disputes among 
political actors, harnessing expertise, and weighing the costs 
and benefits of organizational activity. These very problems 
also help determine our own government’s ability to respond to 
the threats posed by terrorist networks. Managing them de-
pends in part on the organization of military bureaucracies. 
Budgetary priorities also matter, as do specific regulatory 
strategies that can enhance the security of transportation in-
frastructures, chemical plants, and nuclear facilities.228 
Legal arrangements are a critical ingredient allowing ad-
vanced industrialized countries to manage such administrative 
problems, and for good reason. Although adherence to legal 
procedures depends on a measure of symbiosis with political 
circumstances and social practices, the procedures themselves 
plainly aim to strike a balance between flexibility and hierar-
chy.229 They provide a framework for resolving disputes. They 
create procedural mechanisms to promote enhanced bureau-
cratic performance and restrain overzealous action. These ad-
vantages are not lost on some al Qaeda strategists; even when 
they lack the elaborate social arrangements and ability to op-
erate openly that facilitates the implementation of legal rules 
as such, al Qaeda leaders have at various times aspired to cre-
ate quasi-legal arrangements to better manage their endemic 
administrative burdens. Ironically, some government policies 
undermining existing legal arrangements in advanced indus-
trialized countries may seem attractive only because of exces-
sively simplistic depictions of terrorist networks. Policymakers 
and observers sometimes describe a ruthlessly efficient, en-
tirely decentralized yet centrally coordinated, technologically 
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 228. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Fear and the Regulatory Model of Counterterror-
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sophisticated terrorist entity staffed monolithically by equally 
committed, zealous operatives with a common vision.230 In-
stead, the reality of al Qaeda and similar networks exposes this 
description as a mirage—terrorist operatives manage to pose a 
threat not because of, but despite, their inability to fully ad-
dress their pervasive administrative problems with hierarchi-
cal legal arrangements reminiscent of our own. 
No entity with ambitious policy goals can avoid the recur-
ring problem of how best to organize administrative activity to 
deliver services to members or external constituents. In some 
cases, severe problems in these domains persist for both al 
Qaeda and the United States, such as Iraq-style challenges of 
bureaucratic management in post-conflict situations where vio-
lence continues while services must be delivered. But the U.S. 
legal-bureaucratic system the post-conflict management prob-
lem is an exceptional one. Typically, the most pressing admin-
istrative challenges are gradually resolved in our own nation-
state—perhaps not to perfection, but to a significant degree. 
The familiar administrative arrangements characteristic of 
modern regulatory policy not only reflect, but epitomize the 
qualities associated with advanced industrialized democratic 
states. U.S. law, for instance, reflects a broader trend among 
advanced industrialized nation-states to manage agency prob-
lems through some degree of legislative and judicial monitor-
ing.231 The U.S. regulatory state leverages organized interests’ 
capabilities through bureaucratized notice and comment ar-
rangements that permit participation and reshape those 
groups’ relationships to the resulting regulation.232 
Far from being orthogonal to the struggle against adver-
saries such as al Qaeda, these features of the bureaucratized 
nation-state can be critical ingredients for strategic success. 
Nation-states and terrorist networks face pervasive organiza-
tional dilemmas regarding how best to organize people, com-
mittees, and scarce resources to achieve complicated goals in an 
unpredictable world. In the American public law system, law-
makers facing political pressures and seeking to achieve their 
 
 230. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Cuéllar, supra note 130, at 249–50. For a discussion of the devel-
opment of administrative arrangements in other advanced industrialized 
countries, see, e.g., Jeeyang Rhee Baum, Presidents Have Problems Too: The 
Logic of Intra-branch Delegation in East Asian Democracies, 37 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. (forthcoming Oct. 2007) (on file with author). 
 232. See McNollgast, supra note 153, at 213–15. 
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own goals have been largely responsible for creating the mod-
ern administrative law system. They have done so in response 
to organizational dilemmas making it difficult to monitor and 
restrain government agencies. Despite its occasional prescrip-
tive limitations, the basic system of administrative law that 
politicians have forged (along with associated legal doctrines 
and bureaucratic practices) addresses some of the most nettle-
some dilemmas a nation-state faces. These include resolving 
disputes that embroil political actors,233 allowing political ac-
tors to anticipate the public’s reaction to administrative deci-
sions,234 mitigating agency problems,235 allowing the executive 
branch to credibly signal its competence to a skeptical public,236 
and administratively weighing the costs and benefits of par-
ticular actions.237 Because these administrative arrangements 
are capable of serving such crucial functions, they constitute a 
strategic resource of sorts. Diluting or dismantling these ar-
rangements in order to achieve tactical goals can exacerbate 
problems that interfere with responses to a nation’s adversar-
ies.  
Despite its politicized origins, the modern administrative 
law system has become a framework for crafting legal and pol-
icy decisions in a manner that mitigates some of the pervasive 
bureaucratic problems affecting politically controversial and 
factually complex decisions.238 Such complexity arises not only 
 
 233. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 812–13 (1997) (adjudicating a 
dispute involving legislators’ standing to challenge an executive branch ad-
ministrative action). 
 234. See McNollgast, supra note 153, at 186 (“The positive political analy-
sis of administrative law generates some ideas about the policy effects of ad-
ministrative procedures.”). 
 235. See id. 
 236. Enhancing executive branch discretionary powers and limiting judi-
cial review of national security actions may weaken the executive’s ability to 
credibly signal competence and good faith. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Bu-
reaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise 3–5 (June 26, 
2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/stephenson 
.pdf. 
 237. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (1993). 
 238. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CEN-
TURY 170–71 (2002) (discussing how “[t]he new administrative state created a 
multitude of problems,” and explaining the procedural and legal reforms that 
mitigated the difficulties). It should be readily apparent that administrative 
law is neither entirely rational nor balanced. As a product of the political proc-
ess, its tenets reflect the particular distribution of political strength and 
weakness channeled into the lawmaking process. And because they are en-
meshed in that larger political process, legal provisions associated with admin-
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in traditional regulatory contexts,239 but also in the field of na-
tional security.240 Because of this complexity, Professor Cass 
Sunstein underscores the practical relevance of the administra-
tive law model—with its proscriptions on arbitrary decision 
making, its flexible logic of delegation and deference, and its 
increasing emphasis on cost-benefit analysis—for problems 
traditionally involving national security.241 This approach is 
eminently sensible given the difficulties public bureaucracies 
face in resolving national security problems in light of the need 
for a measure of discretion in this domain.242 Moreover, in prin-
ciple modern national security law is concerned with limiting 
arbitrariness. The arbitrary exercise of national security power 
has the potential to waste resources, provide a false sense of se-
 
istrative law do not operate in a vacuum by themselves; they are instead acted 
upon in large measure because the existing political equilibrium makes it 
costly for various players to ignore the doctrine. Nonetheless, although legal 
arrangements do not function by themselves in the absence of norms and en-
forcement mechanisms, part of what makes advanced industrialized countries 
distinctive is that administrative law arrangements survived political efforts 
to address organizational problems that afflict public bureaucracies. The in-
tense litigation, legislative conflict, executive branch interpretive disagree-
ments, and scholarly debate concerning the definition of different legal provi-
sions integral to administrative law is a testament to its importance in our 
system. Though it is plain that rules, by themselves, would not have the same 
impact within loose networks of illicit activity, the key point is that terrorist 
leaders have reason to seek the creation of law-like procedures to govern or-
ganized activity, regardless of whether such organizations have the necessary 
social and political context to make such procedures easy to impose. Indeed, 
such organizations tend to face precisely the circumstances that make follow-
ing procedures difficult, including the need to operate in secrecy, the inability 
to recur to a formal legal system to enforce contractual arrangements, and the 
risk that seemingly loyal operatives will tend to have competing motives. 
 239. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 412–18 (2005) (discussing the complexity of regulatory 
policymaking). 
 240. See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2663, 2663–64 (2005) (concluding that the United States should evaluate 
the authorization to use military force under administrative law). 
 241. Id. at 2672. 
 242. One may sensibly disagree with Sunstein’s willingness to use this 
“administrative law at war” approach as a justification for expansive defer-
ence. Quite likely, some differences of opinion on this issue might be rooted in 
the extent of deference considered appropriate even within more traditional 
confines of administrative law. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: 
The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2582–84 
(2006) (exalting deference), with Cohen et al., supra note 21, at 743–45 (ques-
tioning rationales for deference in conventional administrative law), and 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 227, 261–65 (2006) (detailing the risks associated with expansive discre-
tion). 
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curity, provoke a backlash, or engender unnecessary restric-
tions on individual autonomy. These problems are no less seri-
ous merely because potential restraints on the arbitrary use of 
executive power can interfere with tactical operations.243 
The National Security Agency (NSA) wiretapping contro-
versy further illustrates the argument. Late in December of 
2005, a newspaper revealed that President Bush had signed an 
order in 2002 directing the NSA to “monitor[] the international 
telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without 
warrants,” in an effort to gather intelligence on al Qaeda.244 
President Bush quickly expressed regret—not that he signed 
the order, but that news of it leaked.245 The newspaper article 
constituted a “shameful act,” he said, adding that “the fact that 
we’re discussing this program is helping the enemy.”246 That 
same day, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Mi-
chael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for National Intelli-
gence, held a press briefing concerning the wiretapping pro-
gram.247 Although refusing to confirm details of the story, 
Gonzales stressed the program complied with the Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard for warrants.248 Hayden 
explained that the judgment to warrant “targets” was “made by 
the operational work force at the National Security Agency us-
ing the information available to them at the time, and the 
standard that they apply—and it’s a two-person standard that 
 
 243. Even if one leaves aside the direct benefits of hierarchical bureaucracy 
and external promotion of bureaucratic capacity in the short-term, the ques-
tion remains whether matching the relatively greater decentralization of ter-
rorist networks would actually serve the advanced industrialized nations stra-
tegic goal of responding to terrorist attacks. Greater decentralization implies, 
by definition, less control over critical decisions such as the projection of coer-
cive force. Given scarce resources, more decentralization runs the risk of ex-
cessively spreading those resources, which is precisely what some terrorist 
networks’ strategic studies emphasize as a crucial objective. See supra note 77 
and accompanying text (discussing the goal of rendering Western powers less 
effective by spreading their resources). 
 244. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. 
 245. Edward Epstein, Bush Plays Hardball on Spying, Patriot Act, S.F. 
CHRON., Dec. 20, 2005, at A1. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Press Release, White House, Briefing by Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy Director for Na-
tional Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Press Release], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html. 
 248. Id. 
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must be signed off by a shift supervisor.”249 Hayden later clari-
fied that the judgments had “intense oversight by the NSA In-
spector General, by the NSA General Counsel, and by officials 
of the Justice Department who routinely look into this process 
and verify that the standards set out by the President are being 
followed.”250 
Critics have ardently questioned the administration’s legal 
basis for ordering the NSA to engage in wiretapping activities 
in contravention of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978 (FISA).251 Indeed, the administration has tacitly acknowl-
edged that the wiretapping program violates FISA on its face, 
conceding that the Act “requires a court order before engaging 
in this kind of surveillance . . . unless there is somehow—there 
is—unless otherwise authorized by statute or by Congress.”252 
In FISA’s own terms, the statute is, together with the criminal 
wiretap statute, “the exclusive means by which electronic sur-
veillance . . . and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and 
electronic communications may be conducted.”253 The structure 
of FISA essentially creates an administrative review system for 
presidential decisions to use national security-related authori-
ties to wiretap. To this end, FISA creates a Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) as the means for secretly reviewing 
and approving wiretap requests.254 These requests must show 
probable cause that the wiretapping target is “a foreign power 
or an agent of a foreign power,” and must be approved by the 
Attorney General and certified by a high-ranking defense offi-
cial.255 Critics have questioned the administration’s asserted 
need to avoid FISC. FISA provides for retroactive warrant ap-
plications and FISC has rejected only a handful of applications 
since its inception.256 Some observers sympathetic to the ad-
ministration’s rationale nonetheless emphasize how the court’s 
 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. FISA of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.). 
 252. Press Release, supra note 247. 
 253. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f ) (2006). 
 254. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. III 2005). 
 255. Katherine Wong, Recent Development, The NSA Terrorist Surveil-
lance Program, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517, 518 (2000). 
 256. David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Defending Spy Program, Administra-
tion Cites Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A20 (noting that of the 10,617 
warrant applications the court received from 1995 to 2004, the court rejected 
only four). 
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“cumbersome submission requirements and insistence on strict 
adherence to the law” result in “the government regularly 
withdrawing or modifying applications when it appeared the 
judges might disapprove them.”257 
Administration representatives emphatically maintained, 
however, that the wiretapping was rendered legal by a combi-
nation of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force and 
the President’s inherent constitutional authority. “History,” its 
declarations contend, “conclusively demonstrates that warrant-
less communications intelligence targeted at the enemy in time 
of armed conflict is a traditional and fundamental incident of 
the use of military force authorized by the AUMF.”258 The ad-
ministration’s preferred analogy is between detention and sur-
veillance, emphasizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdi 
that detention was authorized under the AUMF because it is 
an “inherent part of warfare.”259 The administration argues 
that because “signals intelligence is even more a fundamental 
incident of war,” surveillance is therefore implicitly authorized 
by the AUMF.260 From this perspective, the AUMF “does not 
lend itself to a narrow reading,” and represents an explicit en-
dorsement by Congress of “the President’s use of his constitu-
tional war powers.”261 Thus, the administration argues that the 
AUMF transferred the war on terror from a “zone of twilight” 
to a situation in which the President is at the “zenith” of his 
powers.262 
Second, the administration has argued that “[t]he NSA ac-
tivities are supported by the President’s well-recognized inher-
ent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief and sole 
organ for the Nation in foreign affairs to conduct warrantless 
surveillance of enemy forces for intelligence purposes to detect 
and disrupt armed attacks on the United States.”263 Under this 
view, the AUMF merely “confirm[s]” the President’s constitu-
tional authority, as “intelligence gathering is at the heart of ex-
 
 257. Id. 
 258. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVI-
TIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 2 
(2006) [hereinafter DOJ WHITE PAPER], available at http://news.findlaw.com/ 
hdocs/docs/nsa/dojnsa11906wp.pdf. 
 259. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 515 (2004). 
 260. Press Release, supra note 247. 
 261. DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 258, at 11. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 1. 
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ecutive functions.”264 Thus, authorization of the NSA wiretap-
ping program is “primarily an exercise of the President’s au-
thority as commander in chief during an armed conflict that 
Congress expressly has authorized the President to pursue.”265 
Both of the administration’s claims are speculative at best. 
To the extent the enacting congressional coalition intended 
anything specific, it did not likely intend the AUMF to super-
sede FISA. Critics have argued that FISA is designed to regu-
late all NSA efforts to intercept transnational communications, 
and that there is no clear basis for believing that the legisla-
ture viewed the AUMF trumping such an explicit and well-
established program.266 These critics have further noted that 
Congress amended FISA five times after 9/11, indicating con-
gressional intent for the statute to continue to govern wire-
taps.267 Additionally, the Congressional Research Service has 
argued that “[w]hile the collection of intelligence is also an im-
portant facet of fighting a battle, it is not clear that the collec-
tion of intelligence constitutes a use of force,” as authorized un-
der the AUMF.268 
Critics also dispute that the President has constitutional 
authority, under Article II, to permit warrantless wiretapping. 
They note that, given the number of Congress’s enumerated 
powers that touch on foreign affairs, “Congress under Article I 
plainly enjoys the power to decide what measures the govern-
ment should take against its enemies within and abroad.”269 As 
the Congressional Research Service indicates, “The statutory 
language in FISA . . . and the legislative history of the bill that 
became FISA . . . reflect the Congress’s stated intention to cir-
cumscribe any claim of inherent presidential authority to con-
duct electronic surveillance . . . so that FISA would be the ex-
clusive mechanism for the conduct of such electronic 
surveillance.”270 
 
 264. Id. at 2, 30. 
 265. Id. at 31. 
 266. John Cary Sims, What NSA Is Doing . . . and Why It’s Illegal, 33 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 132 (2006). 
 267. Id. 
 268. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEIL-
LANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 35 (2006), available 
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf. 
 269. Harold J. Krent, The Lamentable Notion of Indefeasible Presidential 
Powers: A Reply to Professor Prakash, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1383, 1394 (2006). 
 270. BAZAN & ELSEA, supra note 268, at 27. 
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Three things stand out about the administration’s justifica-
tions for the existing surveillance program. First, the admini-
stration’s justifications focus relatively little on the marginal 
security benefit gained from circumventing FISA, rather than 
complying with its requirements. Second, it offers even less jus-
tification of how the strategy disrupts al Qaeda’s strategic 
goals, internal structure, and budding administrative law.271 
Finally, it presents almost no discussion of how this action 
weakens a system that has been relatively successful at avoid-
ing the profound organizational challenges now afflicting al 
Qaeda.272 When the President authorized the program in 2002, 
he explicitly diluted the administrative review mechanisms 
that Congress had created, thereby exacerbating the risks of 
principal-agent problems, diminishing the extent to which the 
executive could signal its competence to citizens and other 
branches of government, and disregarding institutional solu-
tions to disputes between the legislature and the executive 
branch. At first, these concerns may seem far removed from 
those that should animate a presidential response to a terrorist 
adversary. Perhaps an ordinary, short-term tactical justifica-
tion could still be found for the President’s actions. My point is 
simply this: allowing the debate to play out at that level is a 
mistake. Whatever else Americans are, they are also institu-
tional architects. It is in the details of this architecture—how it 
deals with agency problems and information gaps, what par-
ticipation means, and how disputes are resolved—that they 
might win their battles and reasonably manage their risks. 
 
 271. Perhaps intelligence analysts are hard at work doing precisely such 
investigations and evaluations behind closed doors. For three accounts ques-
tioning the capacity of current intelligence bureaucracies to do so, see THE 
COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAP-
ONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 3–37 (2005), available at http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf; 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 254–77; SUSKIND, supra note 198, 
at 192–220. Moreover, if the President had more compelling rationales to sup-
port his particular policy, it is likely he could have made a more persuasive 
case. Finally, it is not obvious why making such a case about the marginal 
benefit of dispensing with the FISA courts would have revealed valuable intel-
ligence to our adversaries. 
 272. These problems include, among others, the risk that expanding the 
scope of executive branch surveillance without some external review mecha-
nism will dilute scarce resources, and that heightened political conflict arising 
from executive branch failure to follow statutorily prescribed procedures will 
damage the executive’s subsequent credibility when requesting new counter-
terrorism authority from lawmakers. 
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Addressing these risks also depends on recognizing that 
transparency and process have costs as well as benefits.273 The 
technical soundness of some regulatory policies may benefit 
from a measure of discretion, or even secrecy. What makes 
modern administrative law potentially valuable as a strategic 
resource is not necessarily its level of transparency and proce-
dural complexity. It is the fact that its precepts embody a po-
litical compromise that allows policy implementation in a sys-
tem that mitigates some of the recurring organizational 
problems bedeviling both states and nonstate actors.274 
Given FISA’s politically complex heritage and organiza-
tional impacts, the NSA wiretapping illustrates the potentially 
complex and troubling consequences of diluting procedural con-
straints, particularly when the dilution is premised on a ques-
tionable interpretive strategy that ignores existing statutory 
enactments. Policymakers should evaluate the consequences of 
such a move not only with regard to the potential short-term 
tactical advantages it offers for pursuing terrorist networks, 
but also with regard to the broader strategic effect of under-
mining existing institutional solutions to administrative prob-
lems, particularly when similar problems repeatedly bedevil 
terrorist adversaries. If citizens and policymakers are capable 
of recognizing the extent to which organizational capacities 
play an important role in responding to external threats, then 
it is ironic indeed if they fail to consider the impact of counter-
terrorism policies on the administrative arrangements that 
shape those capacities. Lawyers, judges, and policymakers 
should therefore evaluate the NSA wiretapping program not 
only in terms of the tactical needs it allegedly serves. They 
should also consider its laudable institutional effects on admin-
istrative arrangements, that (over time) might otherwise allow 
us to avoid the problems our adversary is constantly seeking to 
resolve. Legislators are entirely capable of making mistakes, 
but it is worth recalling that FISA was created for a reason—
 
 273. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Against Privacy and Transparency, NEW RE-
PUBLIC ONLINE, Apr. 7, 2006, available at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i= 
20060417&s=stuntz041706 (discussing the negative aspects of government 
transparency). 
 274. Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual 
Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 544–52 (2006) (discussing how more 
elaborate procedural arrangements governing regulatory action can mitigate 
interpretive disagreements about the meaning of a particular legal text in the 
administrative state). 
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one that resonates with tones of administrative supervision in 
a complex, bureaucratic state. Insisting that the President fol-
low the most plausible reading of FISA is therefore considera-
bly more than an appeal to formalism, and more even than an 
appeal to a particular view of privacy or rights. 
Instead, FISA is best understood to encompass a basic in-
sight about the nature of strategic competition among entities 
facing organizational problems. Competition among strategic 
adversaries—even of those as different as al Qaeda and our 
own advanced industrialized state—depends on the soundness 
and success of an internal administrative law that matches 
immediate tactics with broader strategic goals. Legislative bar-
gaining produced FISA specifically to harness certain qualities 
associated with our admittedly imperfect but nonetheless valu-
able administrative mechanisms. Those qualities include provi-
sions for a form of external review with considerable speed and 
secrecy and a means of signaling to the larger public executive 
competence in its use of surveillance powers.275 Dismantling 
FISA review thus runs the risk of leaving Americans without a 
solution to the same type of organizational monitoring and con-
trol problem that their terrorist adversaries are trying to solve. 
Though it is useful to highlight these common problems, 
the argument is not meant to collapse the critical distinctions 
between nonstate actors and bureaucratic agencies in advanced 
industrialized countries. Neither is it meant to suggest that 
every aspect of strategic battles comes down to an entity’s de-
velopment of its administrative law. Though terrorist networks 
and state bureaucracies face similar problems, they also tend to 
confront different constraints in solving them. The costs of 
screening personnel or the importance of absolute secrecy, for 
instance, may be lower for a conventional state bureaucracy 
than for an illicit network.276 
Rather, the preceding analogy underscores the advantages 
of recasting strategic conflicts in part as duels between differ-
 
 275. Cf. Alistair Smith, International Crises and Domestic Politics, 92 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 623, 633–34 (1998) (displaying a model predicting the behavior 
and reactions of nations in crisis). 
 276. Indeed, conventional nation states are likely to hold over illicit non-
state actors in developing hierarchical bureaucracies, operating with less-
severe secrecy constraints, and building support among (and delivering ser-
vices to) the mass public. In some sense, the structure of the modern, function-
ing nation-state has evolved to perform precisely such functions, and may 
therefore ultimately pose a greater threat than an illicit non-state actor strug-
gling to solve the most basic organizational problems. 
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ent administrative arrangements. In the United States, Ameri-
can lawmakers and organized interests have built legal ar-
rangements to manage recurring organizational problems. Al 
Qaeda members have made their own moves to solve pervasive 
organizational problems, and in some cases, these moves have 
included drives to create hierarchical arrangements not unlike 
those instituted in advanced industrialized countries. To wit: 
not all organizations must solve their dilemmas the same way. 
Yet no organization can avoid its encounter with a world of 
mixed motives, information gaps, and agency problems.  
The implication of this comparison is deceptively simple, 
but ironically hints at the importance of complexity in evaluat-
ing the legacy of the September 11 attacks. It underscores the 
importance of thinking carefully about how organizational 
problems are being managed among adversaries. It suggests 
that the correct way to evaluate the NSA’s warrantless eaves-
dropping tactics and similar enforcement strategies rests only 
partly on the immediate tactical advantage achieved against 
the adversary. Instead the evaluation should also include how 
the policy affects competition between administrative arrange-
ments—and in particular, whether warrantless surveillance 
erodes the legal conventions and administrative arrangements 
that Americans have built to solve the challenges that more 
frequently bedevil adversaries such as al Qaeda. 
  CONCLUSION   
Legal change is in some measure a product of how actors 
who can shape the law discuss the problems they are allegedly 
trying to solve, and how they choose to frame a conversation 
about the relevant costs entailed in solving those problems. In 
the years following the 9/11 attacks, those discussions have 
taken place in five subtly interconnected arenas: courtrooms, 
legislatures, executive branch offices, scholarly communities, 
and the media.277 Americans have witnessed fierce disagree-
ments in those arenas about the methods and even the propri-
ety of consequentialist analysis, and about the extent to which 
the danger posed by a nimble, secretive, and ruthlessly effec-
tive nonstate adversary justifies reshaping the legal architec-
ture of surveillance or executive power. Yet participants in 
 
 277. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 238, at 588–91 (discussing the role of social 
change, public perceptions, political developments, and diffusion of ideas 
through the media as sources of legal change). 
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these debates seldom question the analytic value of the prevail-
ing metaphor of terrorist organizations themselves, one that 
repeatedly plays up the allegedly radical distinctions between 
our familiar bureaucratic structures and their disaggregated 
postmodern entities. Given the stakes in choosing a metaphor 
to depict organization of nonstate actors, one should ask 
whether the prevailing depiction matches what al Qaeda’s own 
strategists describe. 
Al Qaeda’s own jihadi strategic studies provide a revealing 
portrait of the organization, particularly when they are read 
against the backdrop of political scientists’ emerging studies of 
terrorists’ organizational dynamics. Although obvious differ-
ences arise when comparing an occasionally amorphous non-
state actor to the bureaucratized government of an advanced 
industrialized country such as the United States, certain paral-
lels exist between the internal management problems al Qaeda 
faces and the problems our own government addresses through 
an elaborate body of administrative law. Terrorist networks 
struggle to restrain overzealous action, to align the incentives 
of leaders and staff, and to promote a sense of public legitimacy 
about their goals and strategies. Belying conventional images 
of their unrestrained radicalism, al Qaeda and its analogues of-
ten enlist technocratic solutions to manage their money, to plan 
the delivery of services in territories they control, and to ana-
lyze public reactions. But in harnessing such technical knowl-
edge they face considerable difficulties resulting from opera-
tional security and recruitment problems. In part because of 
these constraints, terrorist strategists often seek internal ar-
rangements—analogous to our own domestic administrative 
law—to realize long-term strategic goals. These arrangements 
emerge from learning from Western management texts, solving 
bureaucratic agency problems, harnessing expertise, generat-
ing information and participation, and adjudicating internal 
disputes. An investigation of al Qaeda’s continuing efforts to fix 
its strategic goals and construct a law-like administrative 
framework to achieve them yields a number of tentative policy 
implications, including (for example) the conclusion that poli-
cymakers should evaluate counter-terrorism policies in part on 
the basis of whether these policies assist or hinder the organi-
zation’s efforts to foment sympathy and participation among 
the Muslim and Arab public. 
Ironically, key features of the legal system associated with 
the modern regulatory state both reflect and play an important 
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role in mitigating the challenges that confront terrorist net-
works. Terrorists networks, like a conventional advanced in-
dustrialized nation-state, face fundamental dilemmas where an 
element of hierarchy, bureaucracy, and rule-based norms is 
imprescindible. Terrorists do not have formal administrative 
law, nor have they developed the social and political norms to 
conform to it. But, in contrast to conventional wisdom, their 
leaders are hard at work trying to fashion analogous versions. 
In effect, organizational success—for both terrorist networks 
and bureaucratized nation-states—depends on managing clas-
sic administrative law concerns: agency problems, the genera-
tion of expertise and information, legitimacy and participation, 
and the adjudication of disputes among actors who share 
power. By appreciating these parallels, Americans may garner 
a richer perspective on the value of their own internal ar-
rangements. They should therefore understand strategic con-
flicts in part as a contest between dueling administrative ar-
rangements managing risks that can never be entirely 
extinguished. And they would do well to evaluate counter-
terrorism policies in part on the basis of how those policies af-
fect administrative capacity. Viewed this way, the persistent 
strategic challenge of managing terrorism-related risks will 
more readily resemble a struggle to reasonably mitigate mur-
ders, traffic accidents, and occupational safety deaths, and will 
less resemble an unrelenting struggle to reduce any possible 
danger to zero. 
